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Abstract
The secret ballot is one of the cornerstones of democracy. We contend that
the historical process of modernization caused the switch from open to secret
ballot with the underlying mechanism being that income growth, urbanization,
and rising education standards undermined vote markets and made electoral
corruption uneconomical. We undertake event history studies of ballot reform
in Western Europe and the Americas during the 19th and 20th centuries to
establish that modernization was systematically related to ballot reform. We
study electoral turnout before and after ballot reform amongst the US states
and British parliamentary constituencies to substantiate the hypothesis that
modernization made vote buying uneconomical.
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1 Introduction
One of the most striking facts in comparative political economy is the positive correla-
tion between income and democracy. Since the rst statistical evidence was unearthed
in the late 1950s by Seymour M. Lipset in his inuential paper Social Requisites of
Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy(Lipset, 1959), a lively
debate amongst political scientists, sociologists, and economists regarding the correct
interpretation of this correlation has raged. Lipset (1959, p. 86) himself interprets, in
what has subsequently become known as modernization theory, the correlation as a
unidirectional causal relationship from economic development to democracy or as he
puts it economic development involving industrialization, urbanization, higher edu-
cational standards and a steady increase in the overall wealth of the society is a basic
condition sustaining democracy. This interpretation has been questioned by many
subsequent scholars.
In one corner, we nd among many others Moore (1966), Przeworski and Limongi
(1997), and Acemoglu et al. (2008). Przeworski and Limongi (1997, p. 167) declare
that there are no grounds to believe that economic development breeds democracies
and instead attribute the correlation to the fact that democracy is more likely to survive
in rich than in poor countries. Acemoglu et al. (2008, p. 810) conclude that there
is no relationship between changes in income per capita and changes in democracy1
and instead suggest that the correlation can be explained by the fact that countries
at critical junctures in the past were pushed on to divergent development paths, some
of which led to economic prosperity and democracy and some of which did not.
In the opposite corner, we, besides Lipset (1959), nd Barro (1999, p. 160), who
argues that increases in various measures of the standard of living forecast a gradual
rise in democracy, and Gundlach and Paldam (2009, p. 34), who conclude that the
long-run causality appears to be running exclusively from income to democracy, with
critical junctures playing no role in the long run.Yet other scholars endorse parts of
modernization theory, but tend to stress di¤erent mechanisms than those envisaged
by Lipset (1959). Rueschemeyer et al. (1993, pp. 74-75), for example, suggest that
1Boix (2009) and Benhabib et al. (2011) challenge the econometric evidence presented by Ace-
moglu et al. (2008) and claim that there is a statistically signicant relationship between income
growth and democratization in a larger sample.
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capitalist development is related to democracy because it shifts the balance of class
power, because it weakens the power of the landlord class and strengthens subordinate
classes.
We propose a new perspective on the modernization debate. We hope that it will
help explore the boundaries of the theory in a more nuanced way and that it will
defuse some of the tension in the debate. We begin by observing that democracy is
a package of institutions. This observation is neither new nor novel and most writers
make a distinction between di¤erent aspects of democracy.2 Yet, the modernization
debate centers on the causal relationship between GDP per capita and composite in-
dices of democracy. It is, therefore, either assumed that democratization is an all
or nothing choicea view that is contradicted by the historical recordor that all the
sub-components of the overall package are equally likely (or unlikely) to be causally
driven by modernization. The alternative view we propose is that modernization may
be causally linked to specic sub-components of the overall package of democratic in-
stitutions without necessarily governing, in a causal sense, the evolution of the overall
package or all of its parts.3
In this paper, we zoom in on the secret ballot and ask if its adoption was caused
by economic development.4 We focus on the secret ballot for three related reasons.
First, the secret ballot is regarded as one of the cornerstones of free and fair elections
(e.g., Rokkan, 1961; Elklit, 2000; Alvarez et al., 1996). In fact, Baland and Robinson
(2007, p. 140) note that the introduction of political institutions that stop corruption
and vote buying, such as the Australian ballot, appear to be as signicant a step in
the process of political development as the construction of electoral democracy itself.
Against this background, gaining a better understanding of how and why the secret
ballot came about is important in itself.5 Second, during the second and third waves
2Dahl (1971), for example, denes democracy by three attributes, public contestation, right to
participate,and civil liberties.
3Ziblatt (2006) makes a similar argument.
4Other aspects of the package of democratic institutions have already received substantial atten-
tion. See, for example, Boix (1999), Blais et al. (2004), and Andrews and Jackman (2005) for studies
of the factors behind the adoption of proportional representation and Przeworski (2009), Aidt and
Jensen (2011) for studies of the causes of su¤rage reform in general and Braun and Kvanicka (2011)
for a study of womens su¤rage in particular.
5The secret ballot has not received much attention in the empirical literature on the causes and
consequences of democratization but there are some exceptions, most notably Anderson and Tollison
(1990), Heckelman (1995), Stokes (2005), Ziblatt (2009), Aidt and Jensen (2009), and Przeworski
(2010).
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of democratization democracy, typically, came as a complete package of de jure in-
stitutions including the secret ballot and universal su¤rage. The Eastern European
countries are prime examples of this as are Spain, Portugal, and Greece but examples
also abound in post-colonial Africa. Historically, however, the process of democratiza-
tion was a more gradual process where restrictions on participation, on contestation,
and on civil liberties were relaxed step by step to eventually reach what we today
recognize as democracy.6 The gradual pattern in itself does not prove that modern-
ization played a causal role during the rst wave of democratization. However, it does
suggest the possibility that modernization could have played a di¤erent role for each of
these steps towards full-edged democracy and that it will be fruitful to study aspects
of democracy individually. Third, there is a straightforward causal mechanism that
links modernization to the secret ballot. The mechanism operates through the vote
market. E¤ective vote markets thrive under open or semi-open voting because this
allows the buyer of a vote to verify that the seller kept his part of the bargain and
their e¤ectiveness is enhanced through social control and resort to e¤ective economic
sanctions if promises are not kept (Baland and Robinson, 2008).7 Modernization tends
to erode social control and the scope for economic sanction, to improve outside options
for ordinary voters, or to undermine old norms of social deference. Income growth also
tends to increase the price of a vote. All of these forces combine to make vote buying
uneconomical. The defenders of the open ballot then become less stout defenders and
ballot reform becomes more likely.
We begin the analysis by formalizing the logic behind our reasoning in a rational
choice model of ballot reform. The model demonstrates amongst other things how and
why modernization undermines the vote market and how this can trigger the secret
ballot. To support these predictions empirically, we marshal two types of evidence.
The rst type of evidence is based on event history studies of the adoption of the
secret ballot. This research design enables us to ask whether modernizationhigher
income levels, urbanization, and higher education standardscan predict the timing of
these adoptions in three di¤erent historical samples: Western Europe plus (English-
6This is documented, for example, in Rueschemeyer et al. (1993), Collier (1999), Przeworski
(2008), and Congleton (2011).
7Stokes (2005) and Collier and Vicente (2012) show how vote markets can operate under secret
ballot, but with more di¢ culty than under open ballot.
4
speaking) o¤-shoots (1820-1913), Latin America (1820-1958), and US states (1840-
1950). In all cases, we nd strong evidence, which is robust to instrumental variable
estimations, that modernization a¤ected the timing of the secret ballot. In contrast,
the same (modernization) variables cannot predict the timing of reforms that extended
the su¤rage to broader segments of the male population.8 The second type of evidence
delves deeper into the underlying causal mechanism. Heckelman (1995) conjectures
that electoral turnout falls as a consequence of the secret ballot. The reason is that the
vote as a tradable commodity loses (much of) its value and voters have one less reason
to show up and cast their largely inconsequential vote. The drop in turnout after the
secret ballot is introduced can, therefore, be taken as an indicator of the importance
of the vote market under open ballot. We can, then, ask whether the fall in turnout is
smaller in places where modernization has progressed more, as one would expect if the
mechanism through which modernization encourages ballot reform is the vote market.
We investigate this in two contexts. The rst is, building on Heckelman (1995), the
US states from 1870 to 1950. The second is the parliamentary constituencies of the
Great Britain in the election before and after the Ballot Act of 1872. In both cases,
we nd evidence consistent with the proposed causal mechanism.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical
framework. Section 3 presents the results of the three event history studies. Section 4
examines the e¤ects of the secret ballot on turnout. Section 5 concludes. Appendices
A and B contain mathematical proofs and a list of denitions of all the variables
used in the empirical investigation, respectively. Supplementary appendices S1, S2
and S3 contain detailed information on the timing of ballot reforms and on empirical
robustness checks as well as a discussion of the assumptions of the model.
2 A Theory of Ballot Reform
In this section, we propose a theory of ballot reform.9 In contrast to existing theories,
such as Heckelman and Yates (2002) or Baland and Robinson (2008), we emphasize
8Przeworski (2009) shows for a large cross-national sample of countries after World War I that
the threat of revolution, to a greater extent than income growth or urbanization, drove the franchise
extension. Aidt and Jensen (2011) draw the same conclusion from a historical sample of European
countries.
9For theoretical models of vote buying in general elections, in legislatures, and in committees, see
Dekel et al. (2008), Snyder (1991), and Dal Bo (2007), respectively.
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ways in which modernizationhigher income levels, industrialization, education, and
urbanizationmakes vote buying uneconomical and paves the way for reform. Specif-
ically, the model formalizes the logic behind the three particular hypotheses that we
test empirically.
2.1 Assumptions
We consider a society with regular elections in which not only the old elite but also
broader social classes can vote. The su¤rage is not universal and voting is, initially,
open. While we take the su¤rage as given, the choice of ballot system is endogenous.
In each period, two partiesparty E and party Rcompete in an election. Party E
represents the old elite, while party R represents the (enfranchised) middle or working
classes, which, for concreteness, we refer to as the radicals.10 The number of core
supporters of party E is NE. While all supporters of party E can vote, only a subset
of party Rs core supporters have the franchise. We denote the number of party
R supporters who can vote by NR and interpret an (exogenous) increase in NR as a
franchise extension. The old elite is outnumbered NR > NE. Voting is costly and some
enfranchised voters may decide not to exercise their right. The party allegiance of a
voter is observable and the parties share policy preferences with their core voters.11 The
party that gains the support of the majority of those who turn out to vote implements
the policy that is optimal for its voters. As in Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) and Boix
(2003), we focus on the distributive conict between the old elite and the majority of
the electorate and assume that the policy with party R in power is better for voters
of type R than the policy associated with party E and vice versa. We refer to these
policies as policy R and policy E, respectively. With this in mind, we can write the
10The parties should be interpreted as broad social groupings rather than as particular historical
political parties. Party E represents the old social elites whose claim to power is threatened by liberal
democracy. Party R represents groups who stand to gain from liberal democracy. In the context of
19th century Britain, they can be exemplied by Radical Members of Parliament, the Chartists, or
the Westminster Committee and in the context of 19th and early 20th century USA as the Mugwumps
or Liberal Societies.
11The assumption implies that parties can o¤er a type-specic price in exchange for votes. An
alternative is to assume that parties cannot distinguish voters at all and must bribe at random or,
if voters have di¤erent reservation prices, try to get them to self-select. If all voters have the same
reservation price, Heckelman and Yates (2002) show that the minority party has a natural advantage
and that this gives the majority party a reason for supporting the secret ballot. This minority e¤ect
is reinforced if the supporters of the majority party has the lowest reservation price. We maintain
that the allegiance of a voter can be observed for simplicity, but note that our results are not driven
by this assumption.
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utility gain for a voter of type R or E of having theirparty in power as
R  uR(R)  uR(E) > 0 (1)
E  uE(E)  uE(R) > 0; (2)
where ui(j) is the utility that a voter of type i 2 fE;Rg derives from policy j 2 fE;Rg.
Depending on the precise nature of the underlying policies, it is possible that the utility
loss per capita to the elite associated with the switch in power from party E to party R
is larger than the gain per capita to the radicals and vice versa. A neutral assumption
is that gains and loses are of equal size and, as nothing of substance depends on it, we
let   R = E.
The society has an innitely long time horizon. We index time by t and assume
a common discount factor  2 (0; 1). There are two possible ballot regimes: open
or secret ballot. Under secret ballot (SB), voters vote their preference and there is
no electoral corruption; under open ballot (OB), votes can be bought and sold in a
vote market.12 The initial ballot regime is open ballot, but it may be reformed to
secret ballot if the majority party proposes such a reform and the opposition party is
unwilling to pay the veto cost of preventing the reform. We assume that once secret
ballot is introduced, it is not possible to go back to open ballot again.13
Within a given period, we can distinguish between ve stages that evolve sequen-
tially. What happens within each stage depends on the ballot regime. Since calender
time plays no important role, we omit time index t when it is not strictly needed. The
ve stages are:
A. Planning. Under open ballot, the two parties (simultaneously) decide on how
many opposition voters to target with a bribe in the upcoming election. We denote
these targets by nb jj for j 2 fE;Rg.14 The associated cost is pjv jnb jj where pj is the
money o¤ered to a voter of type j in exchange for his vote (to be determined below)
and  j is the marginal cost of raising funds for party  j. The parties care about
12Stokes (2005) shows how party machines even in the presence of the secret ballot can use social
networks to buy votes. Accordingly, vote markets can exist even with secret voting, but they are
clearly less e¤ective. We make, for simplicity, the extreme assumption that the vote market shuts
down with the arrival of the secret ballot, but it would be su¢ cient to assume that it is harder to
buy votes under secret than under open ballot.
13Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) make a similar assumption about franchise extensions.
14The notation  j means not j, so if j = E; then  j = R and vice versa.
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policy, the cost of electoral bribery, and being in power and their per-period expected
payo¤s are
VE = fE(uE(E) +M) + (1  fE)uE(R)  pREnbER (3)
VR = (1  fE) (uR(R) +M) + fEuR(E)  pERnbRE; (4)
where fE is the probability that party E wins the election and M is the utility value
of political o¢ ce. Under secret ballot, the parties do not buy votes.
B. Electoral turnout. The enfranchised voters decide if they want to exercise their
right to vote. Under open ballot, each voter compares the sum of his expressive benet
of voting () and the expected utility value of the bribe (vej ) to the utility cost of voting
(c 2 (0; 1)) and votes if +vej  c for j 2 fE;Rg.15 We assume that each voter believes
that the probability he will be o¤ered a bribe (if he shows up at the polling station) is
equal to the ratio of the number of bribes o¤ered to voters of his type (nb jj) and the
number of voters of his type (Nj).16 The expected utility value of the bribe, therefore,
is
vej =
nb jj
Nj
pjj; (5)
where j is the marginal utility of income. If we let the expressive benet  be
uniformly distributed on [0; 1] for each type of voter, then the number of voters of
type j turning out to vote can be written as
nOBj (n
b
 jj; Nj) = Nj (1  c) + nb jjpjj: (6)
Turnout amongst voters of type j increases in the number of enfranchised voters of
this type. More importantly, by o¤ering bribes a party gives opposition voters an extra
reason to turn out to vote. Under secret ballot, no bribes are o¤ered. This reduces
the benet of voting, and turnout is given by
nSBj (0; Nj) = Nj(1  c): (7)
15Instrumentally rational voters have little reason to vote because the likelihood that an individual
voter is pivotal in a large election is e¤ectively zero and it takes time and e¤ort to get to the polling
station. Voting is, therefore, to a large extent an expressive act (Hamlin and Jennings, 2011).
16This implies that voters underestimate the likelihood that they will be paid a bribe (because not
all of them show up to vote). We could, alternatively, assume that voters rationally anticipate turnout
and estimate the probability of getting a bribe accordingly. Doing so adds unnecessary complications
without yielding any additional insights, and we therefore decided to adopt the simpler formulation.
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C. Vote buying. The voters who decided to vote show up at the polling station.
Under open ballot, a vote market can operate. A voter of type j is willing to shift
his allegiance to party  j if o¤ered at least his reservation price (pj). The reservation
price for a voter of type R is the monetary sum needed to compensate him for the
economic loss of having policy E instead of policy R; and similarly for a voter of type
E. Formally, pj = 
 1
j for j 2 fE;Rg, where we use the marginal utility of income
(j) to convert the utility di¤erential () into a monetary amount. We expect the
radicals to be poorer than the elite. Since the marginal utility of income falls with
income (E < R), the reservation price is, typically, higher for voters of type E than
for voters of type R. Under secret ballot, the vote market is not operative.
D. Polling. The election outcome depends on the relative electoral support of the
two parties and on random events that might induce some voters to shift their alle-
giances (after bribes, if any, are paid). This induces an aggregate preference shock ()
in favor of one party at the expense of the other.17 The shock can, in principle, be
positive (a shift to the radicals) or negative (a shift to the elite) and is introduced to
capture the unpredictability of elections. Under open ballot, party E wins a majority
amongst those who turn out to vote if
nOBE    + g(v)
nOBE + n
OB
R
 1
2
; (8)
where v = EnbER   RnbRE is the (productivity adjusted) di¤erence between the
number of votes bought by party E and party R. The function g, which is increasing
and strictly concave and with g(0) = 0, describes the vote buying technology. Its
concavity captures that it is relatively easy to control a few corrupted voters but much
harder to control many. We interpret the two parameters (E and R) as exogenous
measures of vote buying productivity.
Under the assumption that  is distributed uniformly on the interval [ b
2
; b
2
], we
17This means that total turnout is not random; it is simply a matter of some of the voters who
turn out to vote randomly changing their mind at the polling station.
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can write the win probability of party E under open ballot as
fE(n
b
E; n
b
R; n
OB
E ; n
OB
R ) =
8><>:
0
1b
b
2
+
nOBE  nOBR
2
+ g(v)

1
9>=>; for
8>>><>>>:

nOBE  nOBR
2
+ g(v)

<  b
2
nOBE  nOBR
2
+ g(v)

2 [ b
2
; b
2
]
nOBE  nOBR
2
+ g(v)

> b
2
9>>>=>>>; :
(9)
The win probability of party R is 1  fE. Under secret ballot, the vote market shuts
down (g(0) = 0) and the win probability of party E is fSBE  fE(0; 0; nSBE ; nSBR ).
Since the support base of party R is bigger than that of party E, party E is likely
to lose under secret ballot (fSBE <
1
2
). After the election, the winner implements its
most-preferred policy and earns the o¢ ce rent (M).
E. Ballot reform. Under open ballot, the winning party may, after the policy has
been implemented, propose that the secret ballot is adopted for future elections. While
the majority party can implement its policy platform without the consent of the op-
position, the opposition can, at a cost  > 0, veto such a proposal. The idea we want
to capture with the veto is that reforming the ballot system is fundamentally di¤erent
from day-to-day policy making and needs to pass a stricter test than the simple ma-
jority rule.18 Of course, if !1, then the veto becomes irrelevant but we expect the
normal case to be one with  <1. If a reform proposal is made and not vetoed, then
the new ballot regime applies for all future periods. If the secret ballot has already
been introduced in the past, no reform proposition can be made.
We analyze the model in two steps. First, we characterize the equilibrium in the
vote market. Second, we study the reform process.
2.2 The vote market
If the secret ballot has been introduced in the past, party E wins with probability
fSBE <
1
2
. If the secret ballot has not yet been adopted, the vote market can ourish
and the two parties must, in stage A, decide how many opposition voters to target with
18Most of the ballot reforms that we study empirically were adopted under bicameral systems,
which were widespread in Europe and in Latin America throughout the 19th century and remain a
feature of most US state legislatures today. The franchise or other aspects of the voting rules often
gave the old elites unchallenged control over the upper chamber even if their grip on power was
challenged in elections to the lower chamber. A natural way to think of the veto, then, is that it
represents the ease with which the upper chamber can block proposals from the lower chamber and
at what cost.
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bribes in the upcoming election, anticipating events as they unfold in the subsequent
stages. Using equations (3) and (4) and recalling from equation (6) that
@nOBj
@nb jj
= 
and pj = 
 1
j for j 2 fE;Rg, the two rst order conditions governing these choices
can be stated as follows:
nbER :
1b @g@v (v)  ERE( +M) + 2bE with = if nbER > 0 (10)
nbRE :
1b @g@v (v)  RER( +M) + 2bR with = if nbRE > 0: (11)
The right-hand side shows the cost of buying an extra vote. It consists of two terms.
The rst term is the direct (utility) cost per vote. The second term is the expected
utility loss induced by the fact that bribery increases turnout amongst opposition
voters and through that reduces the win probability of the party that o¤ers the extra
bribe. The left-hand side shows the benet (in terms of a higher win probability) of
allocating an extra dollar to buying opposition votes before adjusting for productivity
di¤erences (as captured by j) and is the same for the two parties. An implication,
then, is that at most one of the parties will buy votes at equilibrium (see appendix A
for a formal proof) and it is the party with the lowest productivity adjusted cost that
will buy.19 Under Assumption 1, this party is party E; the minority party representing
the elite.
Assumption 1 E
RE(+M)
+ 1
2bE < RER(+M) + 12bR :
This assumption is likely to be satised because voters of type R are cheaper to buy
than voters of type E; as we expect them to be poorer (R > E); because the elite is
likely to be able to raise funds at lower cost than the radicals (E < R); and because
the elite is likely to be more e¤ective at buying votes than the radicals (E > R),
as they can use social sanctions more e¤ectively. The equilibrium win probability of
party E can be written as
fOBE  fE(nb

ER; 0; n
OB
E (0); n
OB
R (n
b
ER)) > f
SB
E , (12)
where nb

ER represents how many radical voters party E o¤ers bribes to at equilibrium.
19Baland and Robinson (2008) show a similar result. They assume that one party cares more
about being in power than the other and that competition in the vote market takes place in prices
à la Bertrand. The implication is that only the party with the highest value of power buys votes.
Our result is driven by di¤erences in the cost of vote buying rather than by di¤erences in the value
of power, and we assume that competition takes place in quantitiesrather than in prices.
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The equilibrium in the vote market (nb

ER) and the win probability of the minority
party, fOBE ; are a¤ected by three key parameters, E; R; and NR. The rst of these
parameters controls how bribes are transformed into actual votes, and we interpret a
fall in E as an increase in the transaction cost of vote buying. This is likely to be sys-
tematically related to modernizationthrough a number of complementary channels.
First, a vote market operates most e¤ectively in environments with a high degree of
economic dependency and social control, as stressed by Baland and Robinson (2008).
Industrialization and urbanization open up new economic possibilities for working and
middle class voters and make them more mobile both in terms of occupation choices
and in terms of place of residence. As pointed out by Hicken (2007), urbanization
destroys traditional patron-client networks, which, once they are gone, are di¢ cult
to re-create. The transition from a static agrarian economy to a dynamic industrial
economy with deeper markets and economic specialization, therefore, makes it harder
for the old elite to enforce and monitor vote contracts, and the transaction cost of
vote buying shoots up. Of course, political parties may respond to this challenge and
reorganize to take advantage of the new opportunities that, for example, urbaniza-
tion o¤ers. This happened in some large US cities at the turn of the 19th century,
where a culture of machine politics emerged and supported a system of direct vote
buying. But the general tendency would be to increase the transaction cost of running
a vote market. Moreover, as stressed by Rueschemeyer et al. (1993, p. 75), economic
development weakens the power of the landlord class and strengthens subordinate
classes. The working and the middle classes [...] gain an unprecedented capacity for
self-organization due to such developments as urbanization, factory production, and
new forms of communication and transportation.This also serves to undermine the
vote market. Second, modernization entails higher education standards and a rise in
literacy in the general population. As pointed out by Lipset (1959, p. 79), education
presumably broadens mens outlooks, enables them to understand the need for norms
of tolerance, restrains them from adhering to extremist and monistic doctrines, and
increases their capacity to make rational electoral choices.This broader outlook is
likely to make it harder to enforce vote contracts and contributes to decreasing E.
The second parameter, R, represents the private marginal value of income and is
directly related to modernization through income growth. The third parameter, NR,
12
controls the extension of the franchise amongst voters of type R.
In appendix A, we formally derive the comparative static results. Here, we focus on
the intuition. Modernization undermines the vote market and the electoral prospect
of party E for two reasons. Firstly, an increase in the transaction cost (a fall in E)
reduces the marginal benet of each bribe and, as a consequence, party E targets
fewer opposition voters and the vote market shrinks. This gives radical voters one less
reason to vote and their turnout falls. Yet, the net e¤ect is that party R is more likely
to win a majority. Secondly, a fall in the private marginal value of income (a fall in
R), brought about by rising income levels, increases the price of a vote. Intuitively,
radical voters value money less and so require a higher monetary compensation to
shift their allegiance. This increases the cost of bribery for party E and it buys fewer
votes. The vote market shrinks, and although turnout falls amongst voters of type
R, the consequence is, again, that the win probability of party E goes down. An
exogenous franchise extensionan increase in NRdoes not a¤ect the absolute number
of opposition voters party E wants to bribe but the relative share drops and, as a
consequence, the win probability of party E falls. Su¤rage reform makes vote buying
uneconomical.
2.3 Ballot reform
At stage E, the winning party can, if the ballot regime at time t is open ballot, propose
to adopt the secret ballot for future elections. Clearly, party E has a no reason to do
so as long as it uses the vote market. Hence, a reform proposal must come from
party R;which stands to improve its electoral prospect (permanently) under the secret
ballot (fOBE > f
SB
E ). The implication, then, is that a reform proposal is being tabled
at time t if and only if party R wins the election at that time under the open ballot.
This happens with probability 1   fOBE . As discussed above, both modernization
and franchise extension undermine the vote market and with it party Es electoral
prospect. This increases the likelihood that ballot reform gets on the agenda. It does
not, however, follow immediately that the ballot will in actual fact be reformed. This
depends on the elites willingness to veto.
Suppose, therefore, that party R wins the election at time t and proposes a reform
after having taken power. Party E can veto this proposal at cost  > 0. By doing
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so, the ballot remains open in period t+ 1; but another veto may have to be called if
party R happens to win again and so on. To evaluate whether the elite is willing to
veto or not, we need to compare the present discounted value of a veto to the present
discounted value of accepting the ballot reform. In appendix A, we show that these
present values are:
WE(no veto) = 
 
1  fSBE

uE(R) + f
SB
E (uE(E) +M)
1   (13)
WE(veto) = 
 
1  fOBE

uE(R) + f
OB
E (uE(E) +M)
1   (14)
 vE
 1
R n
b
ER(:)
1    

 
1  fOBE


1     :
Under secret ballot, power simply alternates between the two parties according to the
win probability fSBE , which is determined by the relative turnouts of the two groups
and random events. This is what the numerator of equation (13) represents. Since not
calling a veto at time t means a permanent switch to secret ballot, starting at time
t + 1, this expected value is discounted by the factor 
1  . A veto preserves the open
ballot for another period. Under open ballot, power also alternates between the two
parties but now according to the win probability fOBE ; which takes into account the
vote market. This is represented by the rst term of equation (14). On top of this
comes the cost of buying votes each period (the second term) and veto cost, which is
paid after each electoral defeat in the future (the third term).20 The fourth term is
the veto cost paid at time t.
The elites willingness to veto at time t is the di¤erence between WE(veto) and
WE(no veto). Calculating this di¤erence and rearranging, we can express the condition
under which the elite will veto as:

1  
 
fOBE   fSBE

( +M)  vE 1R nb

ER(:)
	  +   1  fOBE  
1   : (15)
The left-hand side represents the net benet of the veto. This depends positively on
the electoral advantage that the vote market gives party E (fOBE  fSBE ) and negatively
on the cost of bribery. The right-hand side represents the veto cost.
The costs and benets of a veto depend on the two parameters capturing modern-
ization (E and R) and on how extended the franchise is (NR). In Appendix A, we
20Since the economy is stationary, if the elite wants to veto at time t, it will veto again in the
future.
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formally derive the relevant comparative statics. Modernizationrepresented either by
an increase in the transaction cost or by income growthmakes the elite less likely to
veto. The reason is that modernization reduces the electoral advantage gained from
the vote market (the gap between fOBE and f
SB
E narrows) while at the same time the
frequency with which a veto is required goes up because party R is more likely to win
o¢ ce. Franchise extension also makes the elite less likely to veto a subsequent reform
proposal. Since the total number of opposition voters targeted is una¤ected, the gap
between fOBE and f
SB
E is una¤ected by an increase in NR. However, party R becomes
more likely to win elections and, for that reason, the expected veto cost increases and
this is what makes party E less willing to protect the open ballot with a veto.
We summarize the predictions from the model as three hypotheses which inform
the empirical investigation. The rst two are:
Hypothesis 1 (The modernization hypothesis). Modernization increases the likeli-
hood that the secret ballot is adopted by making it more likely that ballot reform is
proposed and less likely that it is vetoed.
Hypothesis 2 (The franchise hypothesis). An increase in the franchise increases the
likelihood that the secret ballot is adopted by making it more likely that a ballot reform
is proposed and less likely that it is vetoed.
The third hypothesis relates to the interaction between ballot reform, moderniza-
tion, and electoral turnout. Under open ballot, modernization (as captured by falls
in E and R) reduces turnout. At the same time, the introduction of the secret
ballot also makes electoral turnout drop. The common logic is that a reason for vot-
ing, namely that the vote can be sold for a price, either disappears overnight or is
gradually deluded. To see how the two e¤ects interact to generate a unique testable
implication of the theory, we can imagine two societies which happen to introduce the
secret ballot at the same time. The only di¤erence between the two is that one is, say,
richer (more modernized) than the other. This implies that the vote market is less
vibrant and that less voters bother to vote in the years leading up to the reform in the
richer than in the poorer country. As a consequence, when the reform happens, the
fall in electoral turnout is smaller in the rich than in the poor country. This gives us
our third hypothesis:
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Hypothesis 3 (The turnout interaction hypothesis). The introduction of the secret
ballot is associated with a fall in electoral turnout and this fall is smaller where mod-
ernization has progressed the most.
3 Event history studies of the secret ballot
The aim of an event history study is to explain the di¤erential timing of discrete events,
in our case the introduction of the secret ballot. We model the (conditional) probability
that a country or a state which has not yet adopted the secret ballot adopts it in a
given year as a function of quantitative measures of modernization (income levels,
urbanization, education standards, etc.), the size of the electorate, and other potential
determinants of ballot reform.
We explore three di¤erent historical samplesWestern Europe plus o¤-shoots, Latin
America, and the US statesthat cover the relevant period during the 19th and 20th
centuries when the secret ballot replaced open voting. We are interested in the year in
which the secret ballot was de facto rather than de jure adopted in a country or a state.
By de facto we mean that the ballot rules were such that electoral corruption, vote
buying, and intimidation were reduced to a minimum. This will, typically, be satised
by the Australian ballot. The Australian ballot requires that an o¢ cial ballot is printed
at public expense and distributed only at the polling stations. The o¢ cial ballot lists
the names of the nominated candidates of all parties and it is marked in secret at the
polling station. Other types of secret ballot, such as the sealed ticketsystem used in
Sweden or France, do not qualify, unless our sources indicate that electoral corruption
were de facto eliminated after the change in balloting procedures.21
The dependent variable reformit is coded 1 if country (or state) i introduced the
secret ballot in year t and as 0 in the years before and after that. A country (or state)
drops out of the sample in the year after its adoption. We assume that both countries
and US states were at riskof adopting the secret ballot from the beginning of the
(relevant) sample period. This assumption is justied by historical facts. Mackie
(2001), for example, observes that the principle of the secret ballot was known already
in Roman times. By the late 18th century it was widely debated in liberal circles and
21Supplementary Appendix S1 provides information on the coding for each of the countries and
states in our samples, and lists the sources we consulted in the process.
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supported by liberal philosophers, such as Jeremy Bentham, and adopted, albeit in a
somewhat imperfect form, after the French Revolution. In Britain, the secret ballot
was proposed by the Westminster Committee as early as 1780 (Schoeld, 2004) and
was used before 1835 in some local British elections (Fredman, 1968, p.4). Thus, the
principle of secret ballot was clearly known and on the agenda in many countries by
1820. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the countries (or states) in our samples
could have adopted the secret ballot from 1820 (1840) onwards.22
We use a duration model to estimate the time conditional probability of adoption
of the secret ballot (the hazard rate) and, as in Beck et al. (1998), we estimate the
following discrete logistic model:
P (reformit = 1jxit;mit 1 = 0) = 1
1 + e (xit+H(:))
: (16)
The variablemit 1 is an indicator variable equal to zero in each year before introduction
of the secret ballot and equal to one thereafter. We allow for duration dependence in
the hazard rate through the function H (:).23 In particular, we allow the hazard rate
to be a function of the number of years a country has been at risk of adoption. This is
important because it is reasonable to presume that the likelihood of adoption increases
as time passes. By taking duration dependency into account, we can rule out that we
are confounding any modernization e¤ect with a spurious correlation between two
upwards trending variables.
The vector xit represents three main groups of explanatory variables.24 The rst
group contains indicators of modernization, such as the log of real GDP per capita,
the urbanization rate, and measures of education attainment standards. The second
group contains variables related to the size of the electorate. This includes measures
of the number of voters and indicators for literacy, gender, or other restrictions on the
right to vote, as appropriate. The third group contains variables that capture alter-
native causes of ballot reform. Many scholars, e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson (2006,
chapter 9), emphasize the importance of landholding and income inequality in rela-
22For countries that did not exist as independent units in 1820, we assume they enter the risk set
at the time of independence.
23The argument of the function is t   tpi where tpi represents either the year in which country i
enters the risk set. To model duration dependence, we estimate H (:) using natural cubic splines
and use the estimated spline coe¢ cients along with the number of years a country has been at risk
of adopting (or since entry to the sample). We use a specication with two knots for the splines.
24See appendix B for denitions and sources.
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tion to democratization in general. We expect that landholding inequality makes the
secret ballot less likely because inequality along this dimension often reects a social
order that favors vote buying. Likewise, higher income inequality increases the de-
mand for redistribution. This may strengthen the old elites opposition to the secret
ballot. Other scholars, e.g., Wejnert (2005) or Gleditsch and Ward (2006), emphasize
the international di¤usion of democracy. Governments in one country may learn from
political reformsin our case ballot reformsin other countries, and more so from coun-
tries (or states) which are either linguistically or physically nearer. Finally, we take
scale e¤ects into account by controlling for population size.25
3.1 Western Europe plus o¤-shoots
The Western Europe plus o¤-shoots sample covers, for the period from 1820 to 1938,
the 11 Western European countries listed at the top of column one of Table 1 plus
the USA, Canada, and New Zealand. We see from the table that the rst country
in the sample to introduce the secret ballot was the Netherlands in 1849; the last
ones were France and Germany in 1913. The dating of the de facto secret ballot in
some of the countriesfor example, France, Germany, the USA, and Swedenrequired
some judgement, and supplementary Appendix S1 contains a detailed discussion of
this. Before the secret ballot, electoral corruption was widespread. Both in the United
Kingdom and in Germany vote buying was concentrated in the countryside where
social control and employment relations made it relatively easy for the landed elites to
run e¤ective vote markets (e.g., Ziblatt, 2009; Seymour, 1915, p. 433). In France, the
practice that voters could write the name of their preferred candidate on their own
ballot paper at home or receive a ballot in a distribution in the streets allowed active
vote markets to operate until 1913 (e.g., Seymour and Frary, 1918; Mackie, 2000).
Similar markets operated in the other European countries. In the USA, vote markets
were particularly vibrant in the big migration cities where party machines exploited
that colored voting papers, indicating party choice, could be handed out at the polling
stations.
< Table 1 to appear here >
25Descriptive statistics are reported in Table A1. Supplementary Appendix S2 contains information
on all robustness checks.
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In Table 2, we report the results of the event history study.26 Two variables capture
the process of modernization: urbanization rate and real GDP per capita.27 We see
that the coe¢ cients on real GDP per capita and urbanization rate are positive and
statistically signicant (columns one and two). When they enter together (column
three), they are jointly signicant and real GDP per capita remains signicant on its
own. The two variables are positively correlated, with a correlation coe¢ cient of 0.75,
and are likely to capture the same underlying concept of modernization. It therefore
makes sense to extract the principal components. In column four, we replace the
two modernization variables with the rst principal component. The rst principal
component, which correlates strongly and positively both with real GDP per capita
and with urbanization rate, has a positive and statistically signicant coe¢ cient.28
Ballot reform is a rare event and this may bias the estimates. King and Zeng (2001)
propose a logit estimator that deals with this. In columns 5 to 7, we report results
using this estimator. The two modernization variables remain individually signicant
and jointly signicant when entered together.
How big are these e¤ects? To answer this question, suppose, for example, that real
GDP per capita increases by a standard deviation keeping all other variables at their
average values. As a consequence of this, the predicted probability of reform increases
from 0.4 to 2.6 percent based on the model in column 3. All in all, these results support
the modernization hypothesis. Economic development predicts the introduction of the
secret ballot.
We use information on the number of eligible voters as a proportion of the adult
population, electorate/adult population, to test the franchise hypothesis. Table 1
(columns four and ve) records information on electorate/adult population in the rst
democratic election in and after the last election before the secret ballot in each coun-
try. The secret ballot was preceded by expansion of the franchise in most countries,
26A formal test for duration dependency in the hazard rate cannot reject that the baseline hazard
is constant over time. Our strong prior is that the hazard is increasing with time and we report
specications with duration dependence although it makes no di¤erence to the results.
27Data limitations prevent us from studying the e¤ect of increasing education standards.
28The rst principal component is strongly and positvely correlated with both modernization vari-
ables with a correlation coe¢ cient of nearly 0.94. Thus, this variable captures modernization much
better than the second principal component which is negatively correlated (correlation coe¢ cient=-
0.35) with urbanization rate and positively correlated with GDP per capita (correlation coe¢ cient
=0.35).
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as suggested by the franchise hypothesis. The estimation results reported in Table 2,
however, are less favorable. Although the point estimate on electorate/adult popula-
tion is positive, it is only statistically signicant in specications where real GDP per
capita is excluded. We have experimented with alternative denitions of the size of
the electorate but the results are very similar. Overall, then, the evidence that it was
the pre-secret ballot expansion of the su¤rage that triggered the secret ballot is, at
best, mixed.
We use the variable gini coe¢ cient to measure income inequality. Income inequality
is (statistically) unrelated to the timing of the secret ballot. This runs counter to other
recent evidence on the e¤ect of inequality on democratization.29 The control variable
population always has a negative coe¢ cient, but is usually not signicant, suggesting
that scale e¤ects were unimportant.30 The variable learning captures di¤usion e¤ects.
It is a distanceweighted index of reforms in neighboring countries, where we use the
information on linguistic similarities provided by Fearon (2003) to measure distance.
Despite the fact that the adoptions of the secret ballot cluster in the 1870s, we nd
no evidence that social learning was important.
< Table 2 to appear here >
The results reported in Table 2 are estimated from a combination of between and
within country variation in modernization, the size of the electorate, inequality, etc.
It is, therefore, possible that the correlations between the timing of the secret ballot
and the explanatory variables are driven by the same unobserved factors and that
they are coincident rather than causal. To show that this is most likely not the case,
Table 3 shows some estimations in which we instrument for real GDP per capita and
electorate/adult population. As in Acemoglu et al. (2008), we use a weighted index of
real GDP in the other countries in the sample as an instrument for GDP per capita
29See, e.g., Ziblatt (2008), Boix (2003, chapter 2), or Ansell and Samuels (2010). The positive point
estimate is in line with the intriguing nding by Ansell and Samuels (2010) suggesting that income
inequality makes it more likely that a majority of the adult male population can vote.
30One can question whether population belongs to a model in which we are interested in estimating
the e¤ect of real GDP per capita and other variables measured relative to population size. The
argument in favor is that scale e¤ects could be important and by not including population directly,
we could introduce omitted variables bias. The argument against is that by keeping the denominator
of all the ratio variables constant, we estimate the various e¤ects from variation in the nominator. On
balance, we decided to report specications with population size included. However, as a robustness
check, we have re-estimated all specications without population. It makes no di¤erent to the results
[not reported].
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in a particular country.31 The logic is the international transmission of business cycle
shocks. The validity of the instrument can, however, be challenged if social learning
e¤ects are strong. As we noted above, this does not seem to be the case in our
data, but by controlling for learning, we can rule out that movements in real GDP in
other countries a¤ect the probability of a secret ballot reform in a particular country,
not through its e¤ect on real GDP in that country, but through a social learning
channel. While this instrument, in principle, is valid for the entire sample, the second
instrument only makes sense for the Western European countries. For this reason, the
IV estimations are restricted to this sub-sample. Aidt and Jensen (2011) demonstrate
that revolutionary events (as dened by Tilly,1993 and others) in other countries a¤ect
su¤rage reforms in a particular country through a process of international di¤usion of
information. Revolutionary pressures are unlikely to be a direct cause of ballot reform,
and so we can use a measure of distance weighted revolutionary events, revolutionary
threat, in other countries as an instrument for su¤rage reform in a particular country.32
In addition to this, we exploit the high degree of path dependency in su¤rage rules
and make use of the one-year lag of electorate/adult population as an instrument.
Table 3 reports the results of the instrumental variable (IV) estimation. The IV
estimates are based on a linear probability model, and for the smaller sample that
excludes the o¤-shoots. For comparison, we, therefore, report the results from a logit
and linear probability estimation on this smaller sample in columns one and two.33
The IV estimates in column three conrm the modernization hypothesis but reject the
franchise hypothesis. The rst stage regressions are reported in the last two columns.
The instruments are highly signicant with large F-statistics for joint signicance and
the J-test for over-identication is passed. All in all, this suggests that the correlation
between modernization and the timing of the secret ballot does, in fact, represent a
causal mechanism.
< Table 3 to appear here >
31Acemoglu et al. (2008) use bilateral trade to construct the weights. We do not have this infor-
mation. Based on the gravity model of trade, we use physical distance instead.
32Przeworski (2010) reports a correlation between a measure of social unrest and transition from
open to secret ballot. However, his sample covers the post-1918 period and thus includes many
instances where ballot reform happened at the same time as su¤rage reforms and this is most likely
what is driving the correlation.
33One can question the validity of pooling the Western European countries with the o¤-shoots.
These estimations show that the results are not driven by this design choice.
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3.2 US States
Table 4 records when the secret ballot was de facto adopted for gubernatorial and
senatorial elections across US states (listed in column one). The rst state to adopt
the secret ballot was Kentucky in 1882 and the last was South Carolina in 1950.
Before the secret ballot, electoral corruption was widespread. Fredman (1968, p. 22)
describes how it worked: the simplest form of bribery occurred when ballot peddlers
or district captains paid a voter as he emerged from the polling place. To check that
he actually used the ballot it was colored or otherwise recognizable and the compliant
voter was followed up to the booth.McCook (1892) estimates that sixteen percent
of voters in Connecticut were up for sale at prices ranging from two to twenty dollars.
The most corrupt 19th century state elections are said to have occurred in New York
and San Francisco. The reason was the high concentration of poor voters and recent
immigrants unused to the franchise (Fredman, 1968, p. 25). Congleton (2011, p. 560)
notes that the introduction of the secret ballot allowed votes to be cast without fear
of rebuke by landlords or employers.
< Table 4 to appear here >
For the US state sample, we have three quantitative indicators of modernization
real income per worker, average years of schooling, and urbanization ratefor the entire
sample period from 1840 to 1950. Table 5 shows the results of the event history study.
Each of the modernization variables is positively and signicantly correlated with the
timing of the secret ballot (columns one to three). When included together in column
four, they are jointly signicant and real income per worker and average years of
schooling remain signicant on their own.34 We have replaced the three variables with
the rst principal component in column ve and we see that it is highly signicant.
These results are robust to alternative estimation techniques, as shown in columns six
and seven. To evaluate the size of the modernization e¤ect, suppose that real income
per worker increases by a standard deviation. Using model (4) and keeping all other
variables at their average values, this increases the predicted probability of a ballot
34The three modernization variables correlate positively with the rst component (correlation co-
e¢ cients above 0.87). As seen in Table 5, column 5, the rst component is highly signicant with a
positve sign. As in the case of Western Europe and o¤-springs, the other components do not measure
modernization well.
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reform from 0.23 to 0.33 percent. This e¤ect is somewhat smaller than in the Western
Europe plus o¤-shoots sample, but still substantial.
Unlike the countries in Western Europe (and Latin America), the male su¤rage was
broad already in the 1840s with 60-90 percent of adult (white) males enfranchised.
Nevertheless, the states applied various strategies to de facto restrict the su¤rage.
These included requiring payment in full of poll taxes and literacy tests (columns
four and ve of Table 4). These steps served to keep poor and illiterate males o¤
the election roll, often aimed at disenfranchising African Americans (Keyssar, 2009,
chapters 4 and 5). Womens su¤rage rights also varied (column three of Table 4) and
some of the frontier states granted women the right to vote long before it became
mandatory in 1920 (Lott and Kenny, 1999). We use these restrictions to capture over-
time and across-state variation in the size of the electorate. From Table 5, it is clear,
however, that these restrictions had very little impact on the secret ballot. We must,
again, conclude that there is little evidence supporting the franchise hypothesis.
We use the variable share of land held by the 20% largest farms to capture land-
holding inequality (Galor et al., 2009). It is only available from 1880, so we lose over
half the observations when we include it in the specication shown in column seven of
Table 5. Yet, landholding inequality is highly signicant and exerts a negative impact
on the secret ballot. This is in line with the ndings of Ziblatt (2008) and Ansell and
Samuels (2010) in other contexts. We nd little evidence that scale e¤ects or social
learning mattered amongst the US states.
< Table 5 to appear here >
In Table 6, we present estimations in which we instrument for real income per
worker, average years of schooling, and urbanization rate. We use a weighted index of
real income in other states and regional dummies for the eight economic areas of the
USA as instruments. The logic behind the rst instrument is the common business
cycle. The dummies for the economic areas capture that states that are located in
the same region share similar geographical conditions, e.g., access to the sea, which
are likely to a¤ect economic development (GDP, urbanization, and human capital
accumulation) but not, conditional on learning, the timing of the secret ballot. For
comparison, we, again, report the results from a logit and linear probability model
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in columns one and two. The IV estimates in column three shows that the positive
e¤ect of average years of schooling is robust to instrumentation and that the three
instrumented modernization variables are jointly signicant. The rst stage regressions
are reported in the last three columns. The instruments are strong and the J-test for
over-identication is passed. All in all, this suggests that the correlation between
modernization and the timing of the secret ballot does, in fact, represent a causal
mechanism.
< Table 6 to appear here >
3.3 Latin America
Latin America has a turbulent political history. For example, since independence, Peru
has changed or modied its constitution 13 times, Chile has modied its constitution
11 times, while Brazil and Colombia have made 8 and 12 changes, respectively. In the
elections that did take place during the 19th and early 20th centuries, voting was
often a public, oral act, with registration rolls controlled by local government o¢ cials
(Hartlyn and Valenzuela, 1994). Gradually, however, secrecy was introduced, but later
and more reluctantly than in Europe and the USA.
Table 7 reports when the secret ballot was adopted in the countries in the Latin
American sample (listed in column one). The volatile political history of the countries
in the sample makes it di¢ cult to determine whether voting became de facto as well
as de jure secret at the dates recorded in column two, which are based on Drake (2009,
Table 2.4), Nohlen (2005, Table 2), and Hartlyn and Valenzuela (1994). The issue is
that electoral corruption returned or persisted in many countries after the secret ballot
was de jure introduced. For example, in Colombiaone of the rst Latin American
countries to introduce the secret ballot in 1853coercion and other forms of fraud
persisted (Hartlyn and Valenzuela, 1994, p. 129). Likewise, Argentina introduced
the secret ballot in 1912, but openly fraudulent elections took place in the 1930s and
there is evidence of vote buying as recent as in 2002 (Stokes, 2005). Even so, Drake
(2009, p. 44) concludes that Latin Americans, over time, increasingly tallied the
ballots honestly and respected the results, and, in some countries, the secret ballot
was e¤ective at weeding out electoral corruption. Baland and Robinson (2008), for
example, demonstrate how the introduction of the secret ballot in Chile in 1958 broke
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pervasive patron-client relationships. All in all, the dates in column two constitute
our best estimate of when the secret ballot was de facto introduced, but there is more
uncertainty about this than for the other samples. Universal male su¤rage sometimes
preceded the introduction of the secret ballot, although we note from column three of
Table 7 that there are many exceptions.
<Table 7 to appear here>
Table 8 reports the results of the event history study. It covers the period from
when the countries became independent, as recorded in column one of Table 7, to
1958. Historical socioeconomic data, including information on real GDP per capita,
are sparse for Latin America and we measure modernization by primary school en-
rollment per capita (primary education enrollment) and urbanization (urbanization
rate). We see from Table 8 that the two aspects of modernization a¤ected the adop-
tion probability positively, but only education is statistically signicant. To reduce
co-variation, we have, as for the other samples, extracted the principal components.
The rst component correlates positively with urbanization rate and primary school
enrollment, with a correlation coe¢ cient of 0.91, and is statistically signicant (col-
umn three). However, the results are not robust to rare events estimation, as shown
in columns four to six, although we note that the rst principal component remains
signicant at the ten percent level.35
In contrast to Western Europe, literacy requirements imposed on the right to vote
were widely used in Latin America (see column four of Table 7). We use these re-
strictions to test the franchise hypothesis. We observe that the e¤ect of the dummy
variable literacy test (which is equal to one if the right to vote was subject to a literacy
test) is statistically signicant with a negative sign in some specications. Literacy
tests were often designed to disenfranchise poor, illiterate native voters. Since the se-
cret ballot also requires a minimum of literacyvoters must be able to read the ballot
paperthe secret ballot and literacy restrictions might, partly, have served a common
purpose. We capture landholding equality with the variable share of family-owned
farms (Vanhanen, 2003). Landholding equality is not statistically signicant. The
35As discussed in footnote 30, including the population in the model is not unproblematic. When
log(population) is excluded, results are robust to rare events, and it may therefore be that the results
reported in Table 8 reect a precision issue.
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variable population is occasionally signicant at the 10 percent level while learning is
not.36
< Table 8 to appear here >
4 Turnout and vote buying
The evidence presented so far supports the view that rising incomes and education
standards, and to a lesser extent, urbanizationfactors all related to modernization
systematically a¤ected the timing of the introduction of the secret ballot. The under-
lying mechanism, however, remains unclear. In our theory the link between modern-
ization and secret ballot reform is the vote market. The available quantitative evidence
on the operation of vote markets comes from a handful of insightful studies of particu-
lar markets and none of these consider the role of modernization.37 In this section, we
provide new evidence on the interaction between modernization and the secret ballot
by testing the turnout interaction hypothesis.38 The logic behind this hypothesis is,
we recall, that the secret ballot, by and large, eliminates the vote market and with it
one reason to vote. This reduces electoral turnout, as rst pointed out and demon-
strated empirically by Heckelman (1995). Our theory also suggests that turnout falls
but adds that the fall should be smaller in polities which have undergone signicant
modernization in the years before the reform of the ballot system than in polities that
have not.
We implement this test in two di¤erent contexts: a sample of US states from 1870
to 1950 and a sample of parliamentary constituencies in Great Britain before and after
the Ballot Act of 1872. It is of particular interest to study and compare these two
cases because of di¤erences in the vote market in Great Britain and in the USA. As for
36Given the volatile political history of Latin America, we control for the general nature of the
political environment (polity IV dummy) and for the level of conict (civil war) in all the estimations.
We observe that these factors are not in themselves systematically related to the introduction of the
secret ballot.
37Ziblatt (2009) studies electoral corruption in Imperial Germany between 1871 and 1912, Baland
and Robinson (2008) study the vote market in Chile in the 1950s, Stokes (2005) studies vote buying
in Argentina in 2002, and Collier and Vicente (2012) study electoral corruption in a number of
contemporaneous African countries.
38An alternative is to test iwhether incumbents are less likely to win under secret than under open
ballot and whether the (conjectured) erosion of the incumbency advantage is smaller in polities which
are more modernized. Przeworski (2010) shows that the secret ballot reduces the probability that
incumbents win elections but does not investigate the interaction with modernization.
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the US states, Ostrogorski (1964, p. 170) attributes the increase in electoral bribery
after the Civil War to the rapid growth of cities. In Great Britain, vote markets were
most e¤ective in the countryside or in small urban constituencies where many voters
were directly dependent on the local landed elite for their livelihood.
4.1 The US states
For the sample of US states, we extend Heckelmans (1995) baseline model for the
electoral turnout rate39, and estimate the following panel model:40
(turnout rate)it = i + t + 0SBit + 1SBit Mit + 2Mit + Zit3 + eit; (17)
where i represents a state, t represents elections, SBit is a dummy variable equal to
zero before the secret ballot and equal to one after, Mit is a modernizationvariable
of interest, Zit is a vector of additional control variables, and i and t are state and
time xed e¤ects. The turnout interaction hypothesis predicts that 0 < 0 and 1 > 0.
<Table 9: Turnout model for US states>
Table 9 reports the results. We use three alternative measures of modernization:
real income per capita, school enrollment, and urbanization rate. In column 1, we re-
produce Heckelmans (1995) nding that the secret ballot has a signicant, negative
e¤ect on turnout, consistent with the hypothesis that before the secret ballot turnout
is kept high because of vote buying.41 Columns two to four report on specications
with the interaction between modernization and secret ballot. The coe¢ cient on the
interaction term is positive and is signicant in each specication. To facilitate inter-
pretation, we introduce one interaction term at the time. In column 5, we include all
three interactions simultaneously. They are less precisely estimated but two of them
remain signicant at the ten percent level and they are jointly signicant at the one
percent level. The turning points for the modernization variables are all within sample
39The turnout rate is dened as the total number of votes cast in a gubernatorial election divided
by the age and sex eligible population.
40The data cover all elections from 1870the rst census year after the Fifteenth Amendment, which
made discrimination at the polls based on race illegalto 1950 for the 48 contiguous states.
41In contrast, for a large cross national sample of countries, Przeworski (2008) nds that turnout
increases after adoption of the secret ballot. One reason for this is that the expressive benet of
voting might increase when voting can be done independently. This e¤ect might dominate the e¤ect
of the ballot on the vote market in some contexts, a point we return to in the text.
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and are indicated at the bottom of the table along with the observed range for each
variable. We can, for example, imagine a state which starts with a low education
level but expands education over the years. If this state happened to introduce the
secret ballot early, the consequence would be a fairly large drop in turnout, but if
it adopts later the drop will be smaller and eventually turnout might even increase.
The last e¤ect is not explained by our model because we keep the expressive benet
of voting constant. However, in practice this benet may increase when voting can
be done independently and secretly. This would produce a countervailing e¤ect that
could dominate the e¤ect of the ballot on the vote market, in particular in cases where
the importance of the pre-secret ballot vote market has already been curtailed by the
forces of modernization. We note that womens su¤rage, the poll tax, and the liter-
acy requirement lower turnout. Overall, these results corroborate the hypothesis that
modernization undermines the vote market.
4.2 The Ballot Act of 1872
The Second Reform Act of 1867 extended the voting franchise to a fairly broad seg-
ment of the male population of Great Britain. It was followed ve years later, in 1872,
by the Ballot Act which introduced the Australian ballot in elections to the House
of Commons. We use the Ballot Act as a natural experiment.42 We study electoral
turnout patterns at the constituency level in the general elections in 1868 and 1874,
both of which were conducted according to the (new franchise and districting) rules
laid down in 1867, but under di¤erent ballot conditions. As in the previous section,
we propose to test the turnout interaction hypothesis. To do so, we proxy modern-
ization with the number of inhabitants per house in each constituency (densityit).
The outcome variable is turnoutit which records the number of voters who voted in
constituency i in election t for t 2 f1868; 1874g. We consider the following model for
turnoutit:
turnoutit = i + t + 1Rt + 2densityitRt + 3densityit + 4electorsit + "it; (18)
where R1868 = 0 and R1874 = 1 indicate that the reform of the ballot took place between
1868 and 1874, i is a constituency specic xed e¤ect, t is an aggregate time e¤ect,
42Berlinski and Dewan (2011) use a similar design to study the impact of the Second Reform Act
on the rise of the Liberal Party.
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electorsit is the number of registered voters. We notice that we allow densityit to
have a direct impact on turnout, in addition to its interaction with the ballot reform.
Taking the rst di¤erence of equation (18), we get
turnoutit = (v1874   v1868 + 1) + 2densityi1874 + 3densityit
+4(electors)it + ("i1874   "i1868) : (19)
Clearly, the direct e¤ect of the reform (1), which we expect to be negative, cannot be
identied independently of the common time e¤ects. However, we can identify 2 and
in this way recover the interaction e¤ect between the reform dummy variable and the
indicator of modernization. We conjecture that a constituency that is more densely
populated is also more urbanized. We test whether the (negative) e¤ect of the Ballot
Act on voter turnout was (numerically) smaller in constituencies that were more urban,
i.e., whether 2 > 0, and whether turnout was lower in places that experienced an
increase in population density or urbanization between the two elections, i.e., whether
3 < 0. Moreover, we expect that the number of electors a¤ects turnout positively,
i.e., 4 > 0.
It is, however, di¢ cult to implement these tests because information on the number
of voters who voted does not exist. Craig (1977) reports the votes polled for each
candidate. In constituencies with more than one seat, voters could cast as many votes
as there were seats. Consequently, the number of votes is not, in general, equal to the
number of voters. However, for the constituencies with only one seat, the number of
votes is equal to the number of voters who turned out to vote, and our test is based
on the sub-sample of one-seat constituencies.43 The estimation results are44
turnoutit =  263
( 1:57)
+ 61:5
(1:92)
densityi1874   614
( 2:09)
densityit + 0:47
(5:31)
electorsit, (20)
where the gures in parentheses are t-statistics based on robust and clustered stan-
dard errors. The combined estimate of the reform and the aggregate time e¤ect is
negative, consistent with a post-reform drop in turnout, but not statistically signi-
cant. More importantly, we observe that the coe¢ cient on density is positive with a
43Our sample comprises 65 borough constituencies in England and Wales and 9 county constituen-
cies in Wales and Scotland. This is not the entire universe of one-seat constituencies because data
are sometimes missing and the 1868 or 1874 elections were sometimes uncontested.
44The results are robust to controlling for population growth (which in itself is not signicant).
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p-value of 0.06. Consistent with the turnout interaction hypothesis, this suggests that
the vote market, before the reform, was more vibrant in places that were less urban.
This conclusion is supported by the negative coe¢ cient on change in density which
we interpret as evidence that urbanization undermines the voting market and, as a
consequence, induces a fall in turnout. Overall, the results are consistent with the
causal mechanism suggested by our theory and they are corroborated by the insightful
case study by Stokes (2011) of the causes behind the introduction of the Ballot Act.
She concludes that the reason why political parties in Britain adopted legislation to
limit electoral corruption and vote buying was that industrialization had made vote
buying uneconomical.
5 Conclusion
This paper unbundles the concept of democracy in order to evaluate in a more
nuanced way the interplay between modernization and democratization. Our event
history study of the introduction of the secret ballot demonstrates a remarkably robust
correlation between modernization and its adoption and our instrumental variable
estimations point towards a causal relationship. This nding is important because it
grants the forces of urbanization, rising education standards, and income growth a role
in explaining political development. For sure, the role is more limited than envisaged
by Lipset (1959), but we contend that modernization, while probably not causally
linked to the timing of the major su¤rage reforms and thus to the evolution of the
overall package of democratic institutions, was a causal factor in getting the secret
ballot introduced. Moreover, we propose and provide evidence that the mechanism
through which this happened was the vote market, which was made uneconomical by
modernization.
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6 Appendix A: Proofs
One party only buys votes. The two rst order conditions are
nbj; j :
@g
@v
(v)  jb
 jj( +M)
+

2j
 Kj: (21)
The left-hand side is the same. If KE 6= KR, then at most one of these equations can
be satised with equality. Since the function g is strictly concave (so that @g
@v
(v) is
decreasing in v), it is the equation associated with the minimum of KE and KR that
may admit an interior solution. Under Assumption 1, KE < KR and nb

ER > 0 and
nb

RE = 0. The second order conditions, including
  +Mb 2E @2g@v2 < 0 (22)
are satised.
The continuation values of veto and reform. To calculate the continuation payo¤
for party E following a veto, let V (OB;E) be the expected present value for party E
at the beginning of a period if the present ballot regime is OB and it wins the next
election, and let the corresponding expected present value if it loses be V (OB;R).
Under the assumption that party E will veto when needed, we can write the value of
calling a veto at the end of the current period as follows:
WE(veto) =  + fOBE V (OB;E) + 
 
1  fOBE

V (OB;R); (23)
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where
V (OB;E) = uE(E) +M   vE 1R nb

ER(:) + f
OB
E V (OB;E) + 
 
1  fOBE

V (OB;R);
V (OB;R) = uE(R)  vE 1R nb

ER(:)  + fOBE V (OB;E) + 
 
1  fOBE

V (OB;R):
We can solve these two equations for V (OB;E) and V (OB;R), which yields
V (OB;E) =
(1    1  fOBE  (uE(E) +M) +   1  fOBE  (uE (R)  )  vE 1R nbER(:)
1   ;
V (OB;R) =
(1  fOBE )(uE(R)  ) + fOBE (uE (M) +M)  vE 1R nbER(:)
1   :
Substituting these two equations into equation (23) and simplifying give equation (14)
in the text. The continuation value following a permanent transition to secret ballot
can be constructed in a similar fashion, but we may simply note that the per period
expected utility of the elite is equal to 
1  fSBE

uE(R) + f
SB
E (uE(E) +M)
and that this is repeated for all periods starting one period ahead and is therefore
discounted back to the present by 
1  . This gives equation (13) in the text.
Comparative statics. Total di¤erentiation of equation (10) yields:
@nb

ER
@E
=  
1b @g@v ( +M)

> 0;
@nb

ER
@R
=  E
2R
> 0;
@nb

ER
@NR
= 0: (24)
Substituting nb

ER along with the equilibrium values of electoral turnout from equation
(6) into equation (12) gives
fOBE = fE(n
b
ER(E; R); 0; n

E(0; NE); n

R(n
b
ER(E; R); NR)): (25)
The comparative statics results are
@fOBE
@E
=
1b

Eb
R( +M)

@nb

ER
@E
+
1b @g@vnbER > 0; (26)
@fOBE
@R
=
1b

Eb
R( +M)

@nb

ER
@R
> 0; (27)
@fOBE
@NR
=
1b
 1
2
@nR
@nb

ER
+ E
@g
@v

@nb

ER
@NR
  1
2b @nR@NR =  1  c2b < 0; (28)
where we, in each case, use the rst order condition for nb

ER and the relevant compar-
ative statics from equation (24) to sign the e¤ects. Rewrite equation (15) and dene
D(E; R; NR)  
 
fOBE   fSBE

( +M)  vE 1R nb

ER(:) 
 
1  fOBE

: (29)
Since the elite vetoes only if D(E; R; NR)  0, any factor that reduces D(:) makes
a veto less likely and ballot reform more likely. The comparative statics are
@D
@E
= 
@fOBE
@E
( +M)  vE 1R
@nb

ER
@E
+ 
@fOBE
@E

=  ( +M)
1b @g@vnbER + @fOBE@E  > 0 (30)
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vEn
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ER
 2
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@fOBE
@R

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vEn
b
ER
 2
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where we use the rst order condition for nb

ER and the results in equations (26) to (27)
to get the second line of each expression. Moreover, we nd that
@D
@NR
=  ( +M) (
@fOBE
@NR
  @f
SB
E
@NR
) + 
@fOBE
@NR
 = 
@fOBE
@NR
 < 0 (32)
since @f
SB
E
@NR
=
@fOBE
@NR
=  1 c
2b because @nb

ER
@NR
= 0.
7 Appendix B: Denitions and sources
Western Europe plus o¤-shoots
real GDP per capita is real GDP in international 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars, adjusted
for the impact of border changes, per capita. Source: Maddison (2003).
urbanization rate is the percentage of the population living in towns with more than
20,000 inhabitants. Missing values are interpolated linearly. Source: Banks (2003)
and Mitchell (2003a,b).
electorate/adult population is the electorate (for parliamentary/house elections) in per-
centage of the adult population. Data are only recorded in election years and assumed
to be constant between elections. Su¤rage is coded zero for periods without elections.
Source: Flora et al. (1983), Mackie and Rose (1991), Mitchell (2003a,b), Cook and
Paxton (1998), www.elections.org.nz, and www.elections.ca.
gini coe¢ cient is the Gini coe¢ cient for income inequality. A value of zero (one)
expresses total equality (inequality). Data are available with 20-year intervals and
missing observations interpolated linearly. Source: Bourguignon and Morrisson (2001,
2002).
learning is dened as a distance weighted average of secret ballot adoptions in other
countries:
learningit =
X
j
 
1 
r
15 #commonij
15
!
Aj(t); (33)
where Aj(t) is 1 if country j has adopted the secret ballot at time t and zero otherwise.
The variable #commonij is the number of common notes in the linguistic tree between
country pair i and j with the maximum number of common notes being 15. Source:
Fearon (2003) and own calculations.
population is the total population in 1000s. Source: Mitchell (2003a,b) and Maddison
(2003).
revolutionary threat is a weighted sum of revolutionary events taking place in other
countries. The weights are the distance between the capitals of each pair of countries.
Source: Aidt and Jensen (2011) and Tilly (1993).
distance weighted GDP is a weighted sum of log GDP in other countries where the
weights are the distance (in kilometers) between the capitals of each pair of countries.
Source: Maddison (2003) and own calculations.
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US states
real income per worker is real state output (until 1920) or income (from 1929) per
worker in 2000 dollars. Source: Turner et al. (2007).
average years of schooling is the average years of schooling of the workforce, estimated
using the perpetual inventory method. Source: Turner et al. (2007).
urbanization rate is the share of the population living in urban areas. Available for
census years only. Interpolated linearly for the years in between. Source: Lee et al.
(1957) and various US Census reports.
womens su¤rage is a dummy taking the value one if women had the right to vote and
zero otherwise. Source: Lott and Kenny (1999).
poll tax is a dummy equal to zero in years without a poll tax requirement and equal
to one otherwise. Source: Lott and Kenny (1999).
literacy test is a dummy equal to zero in years without a literacy test requirement and
equal to one otherwise. Source: Lott and Kenny (1999).
share of land held by the 20% largest farms is the share of land held by the 20 percent
largest farms. Source: Galor et al. (2009).
learning is dened as
learningij =
X
j
Aj(t)
Dij
; (34)
whereDij is the distance (in miles) between the state capitals of state i and j and Aj(t)
is one if state j has adopted the secret ballot at time t and zero otherwise. Source:
Own calculations.
population is the number of inhabitants in the state in 1000s. Available for census
years only. Interpolated linearly for the years in between. Source: Lee et al. (1957)
and various US Census reports.
distance weighted income is a weighted sum of log income in other states. The weights
are the distance between state capitals (in miles). Source: Turner et al. (2007) and
own calculations.
regional dummies are coded according to the eight Bureau of Economic Analysis re-
gions. Source: www.bea.gov.
turnout rate is equal to the total number of votes cast in a gubernatorial election
divided by the age and sex eligible population. Source: Burnham et al. (1971).
Latin America
primary school enrollment/population is total primary school enrollment as a percent-
age of the population. Source: Aidt and Eterovic (2011).
urbanization rate is the percentage of the population living in towns with more than
20,000 inhabitants. Source: Banks (2003).
literacy test is a dummy equal to zero in years without a literacy test and equal to one
in years with. Source: Nohlen (2005).
share of family owned farms is the share of agricultural land occupied by family farms,
where family farms are dened as farms that provide employment for less than ve
people, are cultivated by the family itself, and are owned by the holder family or held
in owner-like possession. Available only with 10-year intervals. We have interpolated
the missing observations linearly. Source: Vanhanen (2003).
population is the total population in 1000s. Source: Maddison (2003).
learning is dened as for the US state sample.
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civil war is a dummy equal to one if the country is at civil war and zero otherwise.
Source: Singer and Small (1994).
polity IV dummy is equal to one when the Polity IV index is greater than zero and
zero otherwise. Source: Marshall and Jaggers (2000).
Great Britain
turnout is the total number of votes cast in each one-seat constituency in England,
Wales, and Scotland in 1868 and 1874. Source: Craig (1977) and Berlinski and Dewan
(2011).
density is inhabitants per house in each constituency in 1861 and 1871. Source: 1861
and 1871 Census of Great Britain.
electorate is the number of registered voters in each constituency in 1868 and 1874.
Source: Craig (1977) and Berlinski and Dewan (2011).
38
Table 1:  Institutional information for the Western Europe plus off‐shoots sample. 
Country (year of 
entry to sample) 
Year of de facto 
adoption of the 
secret ballot 
Year of franchise 
extensions (1820‐
1913) 
Electorate/adult 
population in 
year of first 
election or at 
independence 
Electorate/adult 
population in 
year of 
adoption 
Western Europe 
Netherlands (1830)  1849  1848, 1887, 1894  4.6 
 
4.6 
 
Switzerland (1848)  1872  1848 38.9 38.9 
United Kingdom 
(1820) 
1872  1832, 1867, 1884  8.6 14.9 
Belgium (1830)  1877  1831, 1848, 1893   1.9 3.7 
Norway (1820)  1884  1814, 1884, 1897 11.4 11.4 
Denmark (1820)  1901  1849  25.7 29.0 
Finland (1820)  1906  1869, 1906  8.3 76.2 
Austria (1867)  1907  1867, 1896, 1907 10.6 37.7 
Sweden (1820)  1907  1866, 1907  9.8 14.0 
France (1820)  1913  1824, 1830, 1848 0.5 43.4 
Germany (1871)  1913  1871, 1919  33.0 38.7 
Western off-shoots 
New Zealand (1856)  1870  1860, 1867, 1879 29.1 33.8 
Canada (1867)  1874  1898   22.0 23.1 
USA (1820)  1891a  1870  n.a. 40.6 
Notes: Italy is not included in the sample because it de facto adopted the secret vote in 1861 at unification. 
Australia is not included in the sample because the secret ballot was introduced at the time of 
independence. a. This is the year when the majority of the US states has secret ballot. 
Sources: See supplementary appendix S1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Main results for the Western Europe plus off‐shoots sample. 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
VARIABLES         
The modernization hypothesis         
log(real GDP per capita)  6.361**  6.620*    5.429**   5.322 
[2.439]  [1.768]    [2.105]    [1.44]   
urbanization rate   0.010***  ‐0.0010    0.09***  ‐0.0001  
[3.648]  [‐0.209]    [3.383]  [‐0.01] 
first principal component  1.458***     1.293*** 
[3.271]      [2.936] 
Joint significance of  
modernization variables      6.24**        4.91*   
The franchise hypohesis                 
electorate/adult population  0.0365  0.0551**  0.0338  0.0501*  0.0341  0.0512**  0.0333  0.033 
[1.256]  [2.302]  [0.938]  [1.871]  [1.186]  [2.167]  [0.937] [0.937] 
Inequality         
gini coefficient  28.49  12.33  28.35  16.80  25.36  12.03  26.21  26.21 
[1.444]  [0.664]  [1.389]  [0.928]  [1.30]  [0.66]  [1.30]  [1.302] 
Control variables         
Log(population)  ‐0.498**  ‐0.755*** ‐0.464  ‐0.709**  ‐0.414*  ‐0.658**  ‐0.399  ‐0.399 
[‐2.043]  [‐2.799]  [‐1.354]  [‐2.543]  [‐1.72]  [‐2.47]  [‐1.18]  [‐1.181] 
learning  ‐1.179  1.017  ‐1.257  0.217  ‐1.033  0.929  ‐1.025  ‐1.025 
[‐0.944]  [1.559]  [‐0.945]  [0.273]  [0.837]  [1.44]  [‐0.78]  [‐0.781] 
Control for duration  
dependence and constant  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Yes 
Observations  779  732  732  732  779  732  732  732 
Number of countries  14  14  14  14  14  14  14  14
Estimation method  Logit  Logit  Logit  Logit 
Rare 
events 
Rare 
events 
Rare 
events 
Rare 
events 
Notes:  Robust z‐statistics correcting for clustering in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1;  
 
 
  
 
Table 3: Instrumental Variables Estimation for the Western Europe sample. 
Model  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 
Secret 
ballot 
Secret 
ballot  Secret ballot 
Log(GDP per 
capita) 
Electorate/
adult 
population
Log(real GDP per capita)  8.413*  0.0644**  0.0648** 
[1.842]  [3.081]  [2.330] 
electorate/adult population  0.0466  0.000657  ‐0.00015 
[1.268]  [0.814]  [‐0.467] 
Instrumental variables 
distance weighted GDP  2.093***  1.282 
[26.49]  [0.664] 
lagged electorate/adult population  ‐0.003***  0.975*** 
[‐6.702]  [77.60] 
revolutionary threat  0.0067*  0.352*** 
[1.660]  [3.553] 
Control variables 
gini coeficient  9.761  0.0856  0.147  4.097***  3.859 
[0.291]  [0.329]  [0.510]  [10.37]  [0.400] 
log(population)  ‐0.899** ‐0.011**  ‐0.0083**  0.099***  0.121 
[‐2.456]  [‐2.451]  [‐1.990]  [18.21]  [0.908] 
learning  ‐2.079  ‐0.0219  ‐0.00429  0.184***  ‐0.39 
[‐1.315]  [‐0.814]  [‐0.138]  [6.223]  [‐0.538] 
Control for duration  
dependence and constant  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  692  692  688  688  688 
F‐test of instruments  236.36***  2227.99***
J‐test of over‐identifying restrictions  0.686 
Number of countries  11  11  11  11  11 
Estimation method  Logit  OLS  IV  First stage  First Stage 
Notes: Robust z‐statistics correcting for clustering by country in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
The off‐shoots are not included in the estimations. 
Table 4: Institutional information for the US states sample. 
State  Secret Ballot  Women's suffrage Poll tax  Literacy test 
Kentucky  1882  1920 
Massachusetts  1888  1920  ‐1891  1857‐ 
Indiana  1889  1919 
Montana  1889  1914 
Rhode Island  1889  1917  ‐1888 
Mississippi  1890  1920  1889‐1963  1890‐ 
Oklahoma  1890  1918  1912‐ 
Vermont  1890  1920 
Washington  1890  1910  1896‐ 
Wyoming  1890  1869  1889‐ 
Arizona  1891  1912  1912‐ 
Arkansas  1891  1917  1891‐1963 
California  1891  1911  1894‐ 
Colorado  1891  1893 
Delaware  1891  1920  ‐1907  1897‐ 
Idaho  1891  1896 
Illinois  1891  1913 
Maine  1891  1919  1892 
Michigan  1891  1918 
Minnesota  1891  1919 
Missouri  1891  1919 
Nebraska  1891  1917 
Nevada  1891  1914  ‐1910 
New Hampshire   1891  1920  1902‐ 
North Dakota  1891  1917 
Ohio  1891  1919 
Oregon  1891  1912  1924‐ 
Pennsylvania  1891  1920  ‐1933 
South Dakota  1891  1918 
West Virginia  1891  1920 
Iowa  1892  1919 
Maryland  1892  1920 
Alabama  1893  1920  1901‐1963  1901‐ 
Kansas  1893  1912 
Virginia  1894  1920  1875‐1882, 1902‐1963  1902‐ 
Wisconsin  1894  1919 
Florida  1895  1920  1889‐1927 
New York  1895  1917  1921‐ 
Louisiana  1896  1920  1898‐1934  1898‐ 
Utah  1896  1870 
Texas  1905  1918  1902‐1963 
Connecticut  1909  1920  1856‐ 
New Jersey  1911  1920 
New Mexico  1912  1920 
Tennessee  1921  1919  1870, 1890‐1951 
Georgia  1922  1920  ‐1945  1908‐ 
North Carolina  1929  1920  1899‐1920  1900‐ 
South Carolina  1950  1920  1895‐1951  1895‐ 
Sources: Heckelman (1995), Lott and Kenny (1999, table 1), and Ludington (1911). 
 Table 5: Main results for US states sample. 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
The modernization hypothesis   
log(real income per worker)  1.454***  1.205**  1.160**  0.555 
[3.598]  [2.413]  [2.335]  [1.018] 
average years of schooling  0.506*** 0.299*  0.288*  0.698***
[3.616]  [1.786]  [1.729]  [2.698] 
urbanization rate  0.0215** ‐0.00556 ‐0.00388  0.0168 
[2.055]  [‐0.341]  [‐0.239]  [0.991] 
First principal component  0.569***   
[2.971]   
Joint significance  
of modernization variables  19.64*** 19.07***  15.09***
The franchise hypothesis   
women's suffrage  0.207  ‐0.117  0.096  0.156  0.188  0.187  ‐0.109 
[0.467]  [‐0.254]  [0.196]  [0.335]  [0.417]  [0.405]  [‐0.193] 
literacy test  ‐0.823  ‐0.857  ‐0.848  ‐0.759  ‐0.838  ‐0.7  ‐0.306 
[‐1.202]  [‐1.183]  [‐1.321]  [‐1.088]  [‐1.247]  [‐1.009]  [‐0.630] 
poll taxes  ‐0.312  ‐0.453  ‐0.582  ‐0.265  0.188  ‐0.214  ‐0.501 
 
  [‐0.842]  [‐0.939]  [‐1.402]  [‐0.655]  [0.417]  [‐0.534]  [‐0.934] 
Joint significance of 
 size‐of‐electorate variables  2.36  2.07  3.48  1.76  2.75  1.59  1.39 
Inequality   
share of land held 
by the 20% largest farms    ‐27.93***
  [‐3.283] 
Control variables   
log(population)  ‐0.0567  ‐0.265** ‐0.185  ‐0.0742  ‐0.104  ‐0.0915  ‐0.0977 
[‐0.554]  [‐2.406]  [‐1.360]  [‐0.852]  [‐1.071]  [‐1.056]  [‐0.858] 
learning  ‐0.412  ‐4.755  ‐13.12  ‐6.203  ‐10.37  ‐6.518  8.331 
[‐0.0348]  [‐0.390]  [‐0.985]  [‐0.440]  [‐0.808]  [‐0.465]  [0.712] 
Control for duration  
dependence and constant  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  2,230  2,205  2,242  2,177  2,177  2,177  729 
Number of states  45a  48  47b  44  44  44  44 
Estimation method  Logit  Logit  Logit  Logit  Logit 
Rare 
events  Logit 
Notes: Robust z‐statistics correcting for clustering in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; a. Income data 
are missing for South and North Dakota and Oklahoma; b. Urbanization is missing for Idaho. 
Table 6: Instrumental variables estimation the US states sample. 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
VARIABLES 
Secret 
ballot 
Secret
ballot 
Secret
ballot 
Log(real income 
per worker) 
average years 
of schooling 
urbanization
rate 
The modernizationhypothesis 
Log(real income per worker)  1.205**  0.0103**  0.0156 
[2.413]  [2.163]  [1.418] 
average years of schooling  0.299*  0.00244  0.00943* 
[1.786]  [1.015]  [1.873] 
urbanization rate  ‐0.00556  0.000452  ‐0.000529 
[‐0.341]  [1.281]  [‐1.016] 
Joint significance of 
 modernization variables  19.64***  7.75***  29.06*** 
The franchise hypothesis 
women's suffrage  0.156  0.00942  0.0158  ‐0.251*  ‐0.0685  0.815 
[0.335]  [0.444]  [0.738]  [‐1.811]  [‐0.395]  [0.375] 
literacy test  ‐0.265  ‐0.0138  ‐0.00164  ‐0.0137  ‐0.322*  4.544 
[‐0.655]  [‐1.242]  [‐0.128]  [‐0.173]  [‐2.007]  [0.937] 
poll taxes  ‐0.759  ‐0.0391*  ‐0.0319  0.127  ‐0.581**  3.653 
[‐1.088]  [‐1.841]  [‐1.308]  [1.185]  [‐2.019]  [0.464] 
Joint significance of  
size‐of‐electorates variables  1.76  1.74  4.13 
Control variables 
Log(population)  ‐0.0742  ‐0.00065  0.00185  ‐0.00245  0.188***  3.203* 
[‐0.852]  [‐0.343]  [0.658]  [‐0.0914]  [2.721]  [1.909] 
learning  ‐6.203  0.629  0.739  0.391  3.078  77.97 
[‐0.440]  [1.249]  [1.582]  [0.373]  [0.795]  [1.030] 
Instrumental variables 
weighted total income per 
worker  0.00427  ‐0.00961  10.49 
[0.0277]  [‐0.0413]  [1.500] 
New England  ‐0.402  0.854**  ‐7.371 
[‐1.434]  [2.279]  [‐0.707] 
Mid East  ‐0.322  ‐0.609  ‐7.505 
[‐1.138]  [‐1.450]  [‐0.809] 
Great Lakes  ‐0.419*  ‐0.374  ‐19.88*** 
[‐1.800]  [‐0.919]  [‐3.493] 
Plains  ‐0.511**  ‐0.752**  ‐18.38*** 
[‐2.334]  [‐2.071]  [‐4.382] 
South East  ‐1.059***  ‐2.255***  ‐28.51*** 
[‐4.895]  [‐7.056]  [‐4.904] 
South West  ‐0.626***  ‐2.321***  ‐19.39*** 
[‐3.319]  [‐4.029]  [‐4.647] 
Far West  0.216  ‐0.175  ‐2.406 
[1.022]  [‐0.616]  [‐0.471] 
First stage F‐test  390.46***  975.03***  306.31*** 
J‐test (over‐ID test)  4.409 
Estimation method  Logit  OLS  IV‐regression  First stage  First stage  First stage 
Control for duration  
dependence and constant  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Number of states  44  44  44  44  44  44 
Observations  2,177  2,177  2,177  2,177  2,177  2,177 
Notes: Robust z‐statistics correcting for clustering by state in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Excluded region 
is Rocky Mountains. 
 Table 7: Institutional information for the Latin America sample. 
Country (year of entry 
to sample) 
Secret ballot 
 
Male 
suffrage 
Literacy 
tests 
abolished 
Colombia (1819)  1853  1936 1936
Mexico (1821)  1857  1857  1857 
Ecuador (1830)  1861  1861  1870 
Dominican  
Republic (1865)  1865  1865  1865 
Nicaragua (1850)  1893  1893  1893 
Honduras (1838)  1894  1894  1894 
Paraguay (1811)  1911  1870  1870 
Argentina (1816)  1912  1912  1912 
Uruguay (1828)  1918  1918  1918 
Costa Rica (1850)  1925  1913  1913 
Peru (1879)  1931  1931  1979 
Brazil (1825)  1932  1932  1985 
Venezuela (1845)  1946  1857  1947 
El Salvador (1898)  1950  1883  1945 
Guatemala (1821)  1956  1879  1946 
Chile (1844)  1958  1925  1970 
Notes: For details on the coding of the secret ballot years, see supplementary appendix S1.  The year of entry 
is the year in which independence was recognized (not the year in which it was declared).     
Sources:  Drake (2009, Table 2.4), Nohlen (2005, Table 2), Hartlyn and Valenzuela (1994) and Przeworski 
(2010).  
 
    
Table 8: Main results for Event history study for Latin American sample. 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
The modernization hypothesis 
primary school enrollment   0.623**  0.321 
   [2.154]  [1.135] 
urbanization rate   0.00682 0.00545 
   [1.223]  [0.990] 
first principal component  1.140*** 0.644* 
   [3.213]  [1.853] 
The franchise hypothesis 
literacy test  ‐9.345  ‐4.538** ‐7.895** ‐3.34  ‐3.764**  ‐3.547 
   [‐1.245]  [‐2.505]  [‐2.479]  [‐0.454]  [‐2.107]  [‐1.136] 
Inequality 
share of family owned farms  ‐0.215  ‐0.0462  ‐0.217  ‐0.0161  ‐0.0122  ‐0.0343 
   [‐1.006]  [‐0.392]  [‐1.593]  [‐0.0768]  [‐0.105]  [‐0.257] 
Control variables 
Log(population)  2.11  0.733*  1.526*  0.569  0.606  0.52 
   [0.984]  [1.885]  [1.805]  [0.271]  [1.579]  [0.628] 
learning  ‐25.95  ‐5.022  65.64  ‐33.1  ‐7.819  18.44 
   [‐0.150]  [‐0.0353] [0.403]  [‐0.195]  [‐0.0558]  [0.115] 
civil war  2.629  1.687  2.514*  2.286  1.782  2.324 
   [1.614]  [1.330]  [1.725]  [1.432]  [1.424]  [1.626] 
polity dummy  2.11  0.733*  1.526*  0.569  0.606  0.52 
   [0.984]  [1.885]  [1.805]  [0.271]  [1.579]  [0.628] 
Control for duration  
dependence and constant  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  544  779  544  544  779  544 
Countries  12 13 12 12 13  12
Estimation method  logit  logit  logit 
Rare 
events 
Rare 
events 
Rare 
events 
Notes: Robust z‐statistics correcting for clustering by country in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Columbia, Mexico and Ecuador drop out of the sample in specifications with primary school enrollment; 
Columbia and Mexico drop out of the sample in specifications with urbanization rate. Dominican Republic 
had secret ballot from the year it enters the sample and cannot be included in any specifications.
 
Table 9: Results for the turnout rate model for the US states sample. 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
 
secret ballot  ‐6.08**  ‐168.7***  ‐28.22***  ‐8.784**  ‐133.60** 
[‐2.193]  [‐4.164]  [‐3.339]  [‐2.085]  [3.43] 
secret ballot* 
income per worker)    17.93***    12.43* 
  [4.127]    [1.76] 
secret ballot* 
average years of schooling     5.245***    3.19* 
  [3.349]    [1.70] 
secret ballot* 
urbanization rate    0.160*  0.014 
  [1.780]  [0.11] 
average years of schooling   4.263***  1.735  3.781**  2.16** 
  [2.834]  [1.068]  [2.076]  [2.03] 
income per worker    ‐20.64***  ‐9.779**  ‐13.45***  ‐15.57** 
  [‐4.535]  [‐2.559]  [‐3.495]  [‐2.28] 
urbanization rate    ‐0.490**  ‐0.536***  ‐0.503***  ‐0.56** 
  [‐2.495]  [‐2.763]  [‐2.803]  [‐2.62] 
women' suffrage  ‐13.28***  ‐11.54***  ‐9.484**  ‐11.27***  ‐10.20*** 
[‐4.209]  [‐3.475]  [‐2.422]  [‐2.992]  [‐3.03] 
poll tax  ‐19.09***  ‐14.57***  ‐15.51***  ‐15.76***  ‐13.84*** 
[‐6.03]  [‐5.536]  [‐5.521]  [‐5.173]  [‐5.08] 
literacy test  ‐8.271***  ‐4.554  ‐5.581**  ‐6.419**  ‐4.53* 
[‐3.237]  [‐1.661]  [‐2.041]  [‐2.160]  [‐1.72] 
Constant  68.74***  258.7***  172.0***  196.9***  736.22** 
[15.15]  [6.224]  [5.159]  [5.580]  [1.96] 
Joint significance of the  
Interaction terms         
5.69*** 
Observations  1,426  1,408  1,408  1,408  1,408 
R‐squared  0.79  0.82  0.82  0.81  0.83 
time trend  No  No  No  No  No 
Number of states  48  48  48  48  48 
Turning point  n/a  9.41  5.38  55.07  Not reported 
Interval    [7.8,10.8]  [0.4,11]  [0,92.6]   
Notes: Robust z‐statistics correcting for clustering by state in brackets;  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Secret ballot is a dummy variable equal to one after adoption of the ballot and equal to zero before.  All 
estimations include state and year fixed effects. 
Table A1: Descriptive statistics for the variables used in the estimations. 
Variable  Obs.    Mean Std dev Min  Max 
Western Europe plus off‐shoots   
real GDP per capita  2681 4753.56 4541.49 400  28129.23
urbanization rate  1488 197.45 135.91 0  631
electorate/adult population  1732 31.48 31.01 0  101.90
gini coefficient  1403 0.52 0.02 0.48  0.56
learning  1091 0.16 0.25 0  1.32
population  2722 24571 38601 70  290343
revolutionary threat  1452 0.0003 0.001 0  0.015
distance weighted GDP  1872 0.35 0.10 0.12  0.56
US states   
real income per worker  4778 12043.2 6336.738 1989.977  47727.45
average years of schooling  4798 4.92 2.55 0.20  11.11
urbanization rate  4828 32.29 21.84 0  92.62391
share of land held by the 20% largest farms 1225 0.16 0.053 0.006  0.47
Learning  2627 0.008 0.02 0  0.10
Population  4858 1,682,579 1,942,818 6,077  14,900,000
distance weighted income  5220 1.64 0.58 0.28  2.89
turnout rate  1426 52.30 19.30 2.13  99.99
Latin America   
primary school enrollment/population 544 5.630551 3.062156 0.34  14.79
urbanization rate  1046 116.8609 107.8202 0  446
share of family owned farms  783 8.128736 6.311428 1  30.8
Population  1079 3071.438 4947.492 80.66667  34957
Learning  1084 0.003897 0.004369 0  0.02058
Great Britain    
turnout  74 2260 1812 572  8496 
Density  74 5.6 1.8 4 13.5 
electorate  74 2813 2391 706  10352
Note: We do not report statistics for dummy variables.  
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Appendix S1: Timing of the secret ballot
The Netherlands: 1849. Stuurman (1991, pp. 462-463) notes that in the autumn
of 1849 Thorbecke, the architect of the new constitution, was at last called upon to
form a Cabinet and it was his government that produced the nal Electoral law [...]
There was a secret ballot in all elections.
New Zealand: 1870. Verbal voting lasted until 1870, when Parliament nally agreed
to adopt the secret ballot. Each voter was given a printed ballot paper listing the can-
didates in their electorate. They marked the paper in private behind a screen and then
deposited it into a locked ballot box(www.elections.org.nz/democracy/history/years.html).
Mackie (2000) conrms this year. Przeworski (2010) dates the secret ballot to 1937.
The reason for this is that Maoris were not granted the right to a secret ballot until
then.
United Kingdom: 1872. This was the year of the Ballot Act, which introduced the
Australian Ballot (Asquith, 1888; Mackie, 2000, Seymour, 1915).
Switzerland: 1872. Hewitt (1977) and Engerman (2003).
Canada: 1874. Pillon (2006) and Engerman (2003).
Belgium: 1877. Seymour and Fray (1918, vol. II, p. 193) and Mackie (2000).
Przeworski (2010) dates it to 1879, but this is the rst election in which it applied.
Norway: 1884. Nerbørvik (1986). Some sources, e.g., Engerman (2003) and Prze-
worski (2010), give 1885, but this is the year of the rst election conducted with secret
ballot.
United States: 1891. The dating of the secret ballot for senatorial elections in the
USA is complicated by the fact that the ballot rules were decided at the state level.
We use 1891 as the benchmark because the majority of states had adopted the secret
ballot for senatorial elections in that year (Mackie, 2000).
Denmark: 1901. Elkit (1988, p. 22) and Seymour and Frary (1918, vol. II, p. 177).
Finland: 1906. The Parliament Act that came into force on 1 October 1906 was
a monumental reform [...] The new Parliament Act called for Members of Parlia-
ment to be elected directly and by secret ballot according to a proportional system
based on districts.(http://web.eduskunta./Resource.phx/parliament /aboutparlia-
ment/presentation/history.htx). Mackie (2000) Przeworski (2010) give 1907, but this
is the rst election under the new rules.
Sweden: 1907. Carstairs (1980). Esaiasson (1990) gives 1911 but this is the rst
election with secret ballot. Przeworski (2010) dates it to 1866. While it is true that
the older and varying regulations often demanded the use of sealed tickets(slutna
sedlar), it was not till the election in 1911 that voting became de facto secret.
Austria: 1907. (http://www.parlament.gv.at/) and Seymour and Frary (1918, vol.
II, pp. 62-63).
Germany: 1913. Anderson (2009, p. 88) argues that the secret ballot was e¤ective in
Germany from 1913. Przeworski (2010) dates it to 1867 (i.e., from the constitution of
the Northern German Confederation). The constitution of Imperial German, Article
20, guaranteed a secret ballot, but since it was based on the sealed ticketsit was not
Australian. We follow Anderson (2009) and use 1913 to date when the ballot became
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de facto secret, although Ziblatt, (2009, p. 12) notes that the ballot was partially
secret in 1903.
France: 1913. France had semi-secret elections early in the 19th century, but it was
not until 1913 that it became e¤ectively secret, e.g. Baland and Robinson (2008,
p. 1738), Seymour and Frary (1918, vol. I, p. 379), Marko¤ (1999) and Crook and
Crook (2007). The constitution of 1795 included provisions for the secret ballot (and
Przeworski (2010) dates it to 1820), but it is widely seen to have been ine¤ective
because voters could write the name of their preferred candidate on their own ballot
paper at home or receive a ballot in a distribution in the streets. As stressed by
many authors (e.g. Seymour and Frary, 1918; Marko¤, 1999; Mackie, 2000; Crook
and Crook, 2007), this provided ample leeway for corruption and intimidation. For
example, Seymour and Frary (1918, p. 379) note that the vote was de jure secret, but
in practice almost as public as in Prussia, where it is oral.In 1913, the ballot rules
were tidied up and although the ballot remained non-Australian, the reform is widely
considered to have been e¤ective in providing secrecy and weeding out most corrupt
practices.
US states: Heckelman (1995), Lott and Kenny (1999), Fredman (1968), and Luding-
ton (1911). In some states, e.g., Kentucky, Maryland, Minnesota, Tennessee, Texas,
Missouri, and Wisconsin, the secret ballot was not initially applied uniformly through-
out the entire state and the coding of these cases follow Heckelman (1995).
Latin America: Our main coding is based on Nohlen (2005, Table 2), Drake (2009,
Table 2.4), Hartlyn and Valenzuela (1994), Baland and Robinson (2008), and Prze-
worski (2010). Some of our dates are di¤erent from those recorded by Przeworski
(2010). Przeworski (2010) codes the Republic of Guatemala as having secret ballot in
1945, while Nohlen (2005, Table 2) and Drake (2009, Table 2.4) give 1956 as the year
with secret ballot. The Constitution of the Republic of Guatemala of 1956 requires
secret ballot for elections of all o¢ cials. The Constitution from 1945 did not secure
secrecy for illiterates who had to vote publicly and non-secretly and we use 1956 as
the year of de facto adoption. Przeworski (2010) codes Chile as having secret ballot
in 1890 and Drake (2009) notes that voting was secret as early as 1874. In 1890, Chile
adopted a system based on o¢ cial envelopes with isolation space, but this allowed
ample opportunity for verifying who a voter actually voted for, and Seymour and Frary
(1918, vol. 2, p. 228) note that almost all writers are agreed upon the prevalence
of bribery in electoral contestsafter this reform. Nohlen (2005, Table 2) gives 1925,
but notes that this did not include a single ballot (which is needed to insure against
fraud). Baland and Robinson (2008) discuss how landlords of large holdings usually
registered all their employees by teaching them how to sign their names (as literacy
was a condition for vote registration). The day of the election, the employer would
go vote with all their employeesand in that way in the years leading up to the 1958
reform e¤ectively control large number of votes. We date the de facto secret ballot
to 1958. Przeworski (2010) codes the Dominican Republic as having secret ballot in
1844, while Nohlen (2005, Table 2) and Drake (2009, Table 2.4) say 1865. In 1844 the
Dominican Republic declared its independence from Haiti. The Dominican Republics
rst Constitution was adopted on November 6, 1844, and article 69 (in the revised ver-
sion of 1854) required votación secreta(secret ballot). Spain abandoned the island
in 1865 and a new constitution was adopted that year and we use that as the year
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of de facto secret ballot. Finally, Venezuela is coded as being on the secret ballot in
1893 by Przeworski (2010) while the other sources say 1946. The Constitution of 1893
eliminated public voting and introduced some measure of secrecy but not Australian
rules (Brewer-Carias, 1997, p. 164). The new constitution of 1946 required direct and
secret elections of all representatives and the president (Brewer-Carias, 1997, p. 195)
and we date the secret ballot to that year.
Appendix S2: Empirical robustness checks
Western Europe plus o¤-shoots We have, based on information from Flora et al.
(1983), Mackie and Rose (1991), Cook and Paxton (1998), constructed an alternative
measure of the size of the electorate, voters per MP, dened as the number of voters per
seat of parliament. This measure is also insignicant. Importantly, the results for the
modernization variables are unchanged. We have estimated all models with a random
e¤ects logit estimator. The test of country specic random e¤ects fails to reject the
null of no country specic e¤ects. Importantly, the modernization variables remain
signicant. We can measure landholding equality by the variable share of family owned
farms (Vanhanen, 2003). This variable is only available from 1858. Accordingly, by
including it in the model, we lose more than half the observations and three countries.
The variable is not signicant. The coe¢ cient on real GDP per capita is signicant
and the two modernization variables remain jointly signicant. The coe¢ cient on
electorate/adult population is negative but insignicant. We have checked that the
results are una¤ected if we, instead, date the secret ballot in the USA to 1896 (rather
than 1891) when ninety percent of the states were using the secret ballot (Mackie,
2000). We have checked that the results are robust to excluding the USA or all the
o¤-shoots from the estimations. We have checked that the results are robust to not
conditioning on population size.
The US states Boix (2003, p. 122) notes that racial motives might have played
a role in relation to the secret ballot. The share of blacks in the population is itself
insignicant and it has no e¤ect on our main results. We have re-estimated the model
for the period after the civil war and the 15th amendment (1870 onwards) and without
population size. Doing so, again, matters little for the results. Adding state specic
random e¤ects also has little e¤ect on the results. The test of heterogeneous random
e¤ects across states fails to reject the null of no state specic e¤ects. In the turnout
model, the outcome variable (turnout rate) is a fractional variable bounded between
zero and one. Papke and Wooldridge (1993) propose to use a logit link for fractional
variables instead of the linear estimator. We nd that using this method matters little
for the results. We have added a linear trend to all the specications. The trend is
not signicant and it makes no di¤erence to the variables of interest.
Latin America We have added an indicator variable for womens su¤rage to the
model. The indicator is insignicant and only matters little for the other results. We
have also used an alternative measure of urbanization, namely occupational diversica-
tion, dened as the average of the urban and non-agricultural population (Vanhanen,
2003). Using this variable instead of urbanization rate gives a positive and marginally
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signicant coe¢ cient in specications where occupation diversication is entered as
the only modernization variable. For the Latin American sample, the random e¤ects
are signicant, and a¤ect the magnitude of coe¢ cients on the modernization vari-
ables. Urbanization rate also becomes marginally signicant in these specications.
Maddison (2003) reports GDP per capita data for nine countries before secret ballot
adoption. For four of the countries the data go back to 1870; for three countries they
are only available from 1920. For Chile the data go back to 1820. For Peru, the data
can be tracked back to 1896. A Logit model which includes GDP per capita as the
only independent variable yields a positive and signicant coe¢ cient. However, once
we include other variables, the likelihood function becomes non-concave, and we fail
to nd a maximum. We have checked that the results are robust to not conditioning
on population size and, in fact, both primary school enrollment and the rst princi-
pal component becomes more signicant in the logit models, and signicant at the 1
percent level in the rare events models.
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Appendix S3: Assumptions
This appendix briey discusses the main simplifying assumptions made in the the-
oretical model.
1. Voter type is observable. We assume that the parties can observe who the oppo-
sition voters are and so o¤er them their reservation price in exchange for their
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vote. The other extreme is to assume that the parties cannot observe who is
who but know the reservation prices of the various types and so that pR < pE.
In stage C, party E can o¤er pR. At this price only voters of type R will sell.
Party E can get them to self-select and so the probability that it o¤ers a bribe
to an opposition voter is 1. Party R needs to o¤er pE to induce voters of type E
to sell. At this price, both types are willing to sell and so the party R must buy
votes at random. The probability that it buys a voter of type E is 1
nR+nE
. In
stage B, we maintain the assumption that voters expect that everyone shows up
when they calculate their own chances of being o¤ered a bribe. A voter of type
R expects to get a bribe from party R with probability n
b
ER
NR
or from party E with
probability n
b
RE
NR+NE
(this assumes he cannot get bribed twice) and his expected
bribe income is pR
nbER
NR
+pE
nbRE
NR+NE
. A voter of type E expects to get a bribe from
party R with probability n
b
RE
NR+NE
. The turnouts of voters of the two groups are:
nOBE = NE(1  c) +NE
nbRE
NR +NE
pEE;
nOBR = NR (1  c) +NRR

pR
nbER
NR
+ pE
nbRE
NR +NE

;
where
nOBE + n
OB
R = (NR +NE) (1  c) + (nbER + nbRE):
In stage A, the two parties now internalize both the e¤ect on turnout and on
their chance of buying an inuential vote. We let
v = En
b
ER   R
nbRE
nOBR + n
OB
E
:
The rst order condition will now have to take into account that v is inuenced
by total turnout which is inuenced by voting buying with
@v
@nbER
= E + R
nbRE
(nOBR + n
OB
E )
2;
@v
@nbRE
=  R
 
nOBR + n
OB
E
  nbRE
(nOBR + n
OB
E )
2 :
We write the rst order conditions as
@v
@nbER
@g
@v
 EKE;
  @v
@nbRE
@g
@v
 RKR;
with KE < KR dened in Appendix A. Conjecture that only party E will buy.
Then @v
@nbER
= E and
@g
@v
= KE. Look at
R
 
nOBR + n
OB
E
  nbRE
(nOBR + n
OB
E )
2 KE  RKR:
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If (
nOBR +n
OB
E ) nbRE
(nOBR +nOBE )
2 < 1; which it is if
 
nOBR + n
OB
E

> 1, then the conjecture is
correct and only party E bribes. In this case, all the relevant comparative statics
derive from @g
@v
= KE and are exactly as before.
2. Rational expectations about turnout. If voters believe that their chance of get-
ting a bribe is proportional to turnout rather than to the size of their group,
then the expected utility value of the bribe is
uej =
nb jj
nj
pjj: (35)
At equilibrium the expected turnout must be equal to actual turnout, so turnout
for group j is dened by
nj = Nj
 
1  c+ n
b
 jj
nj
pjj
!
; (36)
with the solution45
nj(n
b
 jj; Nj) =
1
2
Nj(1  c) + 1
2
q
N2j (1  c)2 + 4Njnb jjpjj. (37)
The main di¤erence between this and the case considered in the text is that
the marginal e¤ect of bribery on turnout is not independent of nb jj. Under the
assumption that
pREb
E(E +M)
+
1
2
@nR
@nbER
<
pERb
R(R +M)
+
1
2
@nE
@nbRE
;
it remains true that only party E is active in the vote market. All comparative
static results continue to hold as long as vote buying is optimal. The only result
that requires an additional assumption is the one regarding the e¤ect of NR on
the net value of a veto.
3. E = R. Since these represent per capita benets, the natural alternative is
that E > R, i.e., each member of the (small) elite stands to lose a lot more
than each member of the (large) majority. All results go through when E > R
because this simply increases the reservation price for elite voters. If, for some
reason, E < R, all results holds as long as this di¤erence is not su¢ cient to
violate Assumption 1.
4. Secret ballot as an absorbing state. If we allow for reversals, it is possible that
there exist equilibria where the society uctuates between the two ballot systems
(this would for example be the case if  = 0), but there will also exist parameter
values such that a transition to secret ballot is permanent. It is a question of
nding parameters such that party E will not veto, while party R will.
45We disregard the negative root of the polynomial.
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5. The vote buying technology. This is the critical assumption that leads to the
asymmetric outcome in the vote market with at most one party buying. Other
technologies lead to situations where both parties buy votes. This makes the
analysis more blurred, but as long as one of the parties has a clear advantage
under open ballot and the other has an advantage under secret ballot, the logic of
reform continues to apply and modernization continues to undermine the value
of the vote market by pushing up prices and increasing transaction costs.
45
